

Strategy Revisited

Major Isaiah Wilson III, U.S. Army

U.S. strategymakers are allowing short-term concerns over constrained resources to shape U.S. national security strategy. A capabilities-based strategy is shortsighted and runs counter to traditional definitions of strategy. Basing national security strategy on military capabilities creates rifts with allies; encourages reliance on anticipated but unfielded technology; leads to technological incompatibility with coalition partners; and most unsettling, departs from traditional U.S. strategic policies, values, goals, and interests.

THE U.S. ARMY Command and General Staff College's annual Grierson Award competition honors the Master Strategist of each school year. To be considered for the 2002 award, candidates wrote papers addressing the following questions: "In contrast to the current NSS/NMS [National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy], how does a transformed capabilities-based force structure impact the development of a new National Military Strategy, and what would that then modify in the U.S. National Security Strategy/National Policy? What are the risks or advantages inherent to these changes?"

The essay question called for a discussion of the following:

- A shift from a threat-based force-structuring paradigm to a capabilities-based force-structuring paradigm.
- The effect of such a shift on the development of a new NMS.
- The changes or modifications that might result in the next NSS and national policy in general.
- The risks or advantages inherent in such changes.

The wording of the question belied a larger, systemic problem in what decisionmakers, defense planners, military strategists, and even instructors of strategic art and science conceive strategy and strategic planning to be. A means-determines-the-ends proposition embedded in the question misinterprets the long-established, theoretical definitions of strategy and the strategic planning process.

To me, the essay question introduced a second question that subsumed the first: "Has the United States abandoned the broader, traditional notion of strategy and the strategic security planning process out of short-

term, domestic concerns over scarce resources and/or shortsighted assessments of the threat environment facing the country?” That is, “Has the United States allowed capabilities (resources available) and technological innovation to drive the national security policy formulation process?”

I propose that, in fact, U.S. national security policy (values, goals, interests) tends to determine economic-technological factors that affect the NMS. Assessment of threat in the strategic environment at any given time, during any given administration, is derived from a vantage point of political-public will and material resources the polity is willing to expend, not from an unconstrained blue-sky analysis. In other words, the size and shape of the military force the country is willing to resource tends to determine national policy, not the goals, values, and responsibilities of a global hegemonic state.

This sort of NMS-led strategic and force-planning process is contrary to a better understanding of what strategy and force planning is and should be. By following a wrongheaded process out of near-term domestic necessities, U.S. defense planners—even strategists—have forgotten what strategy really is. The two-major theater war (MTW) and today’s capabilities-based paradigm are examples of how not to develop NSS and the military forces needed to implement that strategy.

The essay question inspired the following propositions:

- That a capabilities-based approach to force planning will lead to a strategy-resources gap and a mismatch between capabilities and national policy intentions similar to its predecessor, the two-MTW construct.

- That such a paradigm wrongly privileges military strategy over security strategy, allowing capabilities and available resources to determine and define policy and strategy.

- That while there are advantages to be gained by politicians and decisionmakers from the strategic ambiguity on which a capabilities-based model centers, the tasks that strategists and the military face in formulating and implementing a coherent, effective national security policy and strategic posture that is more commensurate with the goals and responsibilities of a global power, such as the United States, will be all the more difficult to achieve.

I believe a comprehensive, policy-based, force-structuring paradigm, which incorporates the advantages of threat- and capabilities-based approaches and which models, shapes, and sizes military forces (as well as other instruments of power) in light of national values, goals, interests, and obligations, is a paradigm most befitting a global hegemonic power such as the United States.

The book *Strategy and Force Planning* says, “Making the best strategic and force choices in a free society is a difficult and lengthy process. The strategist and force planner must consider numerous international and domestic factors, including political, economic and military influences. [B]ecause planning involves preparing for the future, there is considerable uncertainty and **much room for disagreement about preferred strategy and how forces should be structured, organized, and equipped.** [E]qually valid arguments are often made for widely different choices, each depending on the objectives sought and the **assumptions made about threats, challenges, opportunities, technological advances, and future political and economic conditions.** This tendency is exacerbated by various advocates **who focus**

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THREAT-BASED PLANNING	CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Used when threats to U.S. interests are “easily recognized and identified.” ● Scenario-based or contingency-based modeling to determine force needs. ● Provides a quantifiable rationale for the recommended force structure. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Used when threats to U.S. interests are multifaceted and uncertain. ● Ambiguous threats do not lend themselves to single-point scenario-based analysis. ● Planners apply a “liberal dose of military judgement to determine the appropriate mix of required military capabilities.” ● Claim to focus on objectives rather than scenarios.

Figure 1. Threat-based planning compared with capabilities-based planning.

[The new paradigm] denies that most U.S. national interests are global and that preserving America’s global leadership is a vital national interest. . . . The Bush administration’s failure might be in how the same national policy is narrowly defined in truly national or “America first” terms, leaving that impression with allies and adversaries alike—an impression reinforced in the types of capabilities the strategy prescribes. . . .

on the single factor most important to them, such as the threat or budget, without a balanced attempt to explore the full dimensions of the problems” [emphasis in original].¹

There will never be enough resources to satisfy the Nation’s wants. Thus, decisionmakers must make strategic choices, establish requirements, set priorities, make decisions, and allocate scarce resources to the most critical needs. However, such decisions should not be made based on any one factor. That sort of flawed approach negates the true definition of strategic choice and sets conditions for narrow strategic and policy determinism.

The approach the United States has taken during at least the two or three most recent rounds of security and military strategy development has centered on how the means might modify the ends.² This is the wrong way to think of strategy. Such an approach is indicative of a flawed strategic planning process, one that tends to privilege short-term concerns and considerations such as fiscal constraints and technological issues over longer term (seminal) issues of national interests, values, purposes, and responsibilities. This latter set of considerations is in line with the more traditional (and more correct) understanding of strategy itself.³

There are numerous problems inherent in the threat-based (two-MTW) strategic force planning approach of the past and the transformed capabilities-based approach introduced in the 2002 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*.⁴ The most significant of these problems (impacts) follow:

- Both paradigms are or were overdeterministic, having been conceived from focusing on single factors deemed most critical at the time.

- Both paradigms fail or failed to adequately and comprehensively consider all factors affecting national security policy and the security and military strategies that should derive from that set of values, interests, and responsibilities.

- Both approaches to the force sizing/shaping question address immediate crises (in their own right) and short-term realities of the day. Consequently, both result in a means-available-driven process (an NMS-led process) that is overly deterministic of the threat environment; of relationships with allies, friends, and potential foes in the international environment; and U.S. national policy (purpose, goals, roles, and missions) in general.

Figure 1 summarizes the differences between what are commonly regarded as the two popular methodologies available for force planning (sizing/shaping).⁵ The two-MTW, threat-based construct of the 1990s clearly outlived its utility as an effective force-shaping model, hav-

ing led to a hollow force incapable of meeting the broad policy goals of former President Bill Clinton’s engagement strategy.

The capabilities-based paradigm that will guide U.S. strategy and force planning into the 21st century, while not likely to become irrelevant because of rigid adherence to a particular threat, might eventually be condemned because a narrow-way national policy, purpose, and strategy has been conceived and articulated in what might be appropriately termed the “Bush deterrence strategy.”

Both Clinton’s and President George W. Bush’s approaches fail to adhere to author John L. Gaddis’s concept of strategy.⁶ Each contributes to its own peculiar strategy-resource gap (see figure 2). In the late 1990s, the two-MTW force-structuring approach focused too much on fiscal constraints, thereby truncating a more realistic assessment of the changing strategic (threat) environment.⁷ The result was the articulation of a broad, comprehensive, do-everything engagement policy, crippled and de-legitimized by a record of less-than-effective interventions. America was soon regarded as the reluctant hegemon that got involved in international crises with “too little, too late.”⁸ This reputation was largely the result of a flawed strategic- and force-planning process that centered too much on warding off domestic demands for force downsizing rather than on national interests and global responsibilities and the resourcing of a force to meet national policy.

The new paradigm might herald a strategy resource gap of its own—this one defined more by its narrowly conceived strategy than by its resources (resourcing). A capabilities-focused approach to strategic planning, an approach the Bush administration has championed since the 2000 campaign, could tend to build “all” (military strategy, security strategy, national policy, and national interests) on the tenuous hopes of future

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	ENDS RELATED TO MEANS	INTENTIONS RELATED TO CAPABILITIES	OBJECTIVES RELATED TO RESOURCES
Clinton's Threat-Based Paradigm	<p>Vital, important, and humanitarian categories of U.S. national interests (broad in conception).</p> <p>Insufficient and inappropriate forces available to conduct full-spectrum operations.</p>	<p>Shape the international environment. Respond to threats and crises. Prepare for an uncertain future.</p> <p>Intervene in international affairs in coalition with foreign partners.</p> <p>Capabilities limited largely to old heavy (legacy) force systems designed for conventional, force-on-force MTWs (specifically, in Korea and Iraq).</p>	<p>The 2-MTW force sizing approach is designed as a stop-gap measure to maintain the existing size and type of forces available in light of the post-CW drawdown.</p> <p>Resources limited to the 2-MTW scenario. Little resources remain for non-MTW contingencies. Little to no strategic reserve.</p>
Bush's Capabilities-Based Paradigm	<p>Limited in scope: focus is on ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action (priority), honoring international commitments, and contributing to economic well-being</p> <p>Leap-ahead means (JV2020) seen by allies and foreign friends as “provocative.” Risk of leaving allies behind in technology-led RMA.</p>	<p>Homeland Security (defense of the homeland) is the priority mission.</p> <p>Shift to an Asia-first focus (divert resources and focus from Europe).</p> <p>Middle East access still deemed important.</p> <p>Focus of capabilities on defense of homeland and U.S. interests worldwide (anti-access, force projection, strike).</p> <p>A deterrence and response-oriented posture (defensive intent).</p>	<p>This approach is born out of the desire for a “leap-ahead” approach to force modernization (part of the Bush campaign platform in Election 2000).</p> <p>Attacks on the U.S. homeland (9/11) elevate “asymmetrical threats” to forefront of security planning agenda.</p> <p>Purpose behind new capabilities loosely defined.</p>

Figure 2. Comparison of Clinton and Bush paradigms.

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technological innovations and the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA).⁹ The result could be the NMS (what America has the resources and capabilities to do) defining the NSS or even national policy and interests themselves (what America “is” and what it ought to do as a global superpower). This is not strategy. This approach denies that most U.S. national interests are global and that preserving America’s global leadership is a vital national interest. Clinton’s engagement strategy recognized these facts. However, his administration failed because of its inability to derive the correct military strategy to meet that broad set of policy goals and responsibilities and to properly resource that strategy.

The Bush administration’s failure might be in how the same national policy is narrowly defined in truly national or “America first” terms, leaving that impression with allies and adversaries alike—an impression reinforced in the types of capabilities the strategy prescribes (leap-ahead; strike; forced-entry; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and so on).¹⁰

National Missile Defense (NMD) is a perfect example of—

- A U.S.-centric posture.
- A U.S. defense-oriented, force-development plan.
- How a purely capabilities-based force-shaping and sizing paradigm can signal U.S. unilateralism.
- A distanced, adversarial approach to the international environment.

The response the Pentagon’s Joint Vision (JV)2020 received from U.S. transatlantic allies evidences this potential: “America leads but

A Historical Aside¹

Understanding the evolution toward what has become the two-MTW force-planning construct is important to understanding and appreciating the conditions from which the approach was derived, how it was originally conceived, and why it was eventually adopted as the force-sizing model that would underlie the NSS/NMS during the mid-to-late 1990s. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell and former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin are attributed with creating the Base Force during President George H.W. Bush’s administration. Theirs was one of the first efforts at demonstrating military responsiveness to changes in strategic and budgetary environments.

The Base Force was considered a minimum force that would still allow U.S. Armed Forces to meet mission requirements with acceptable risks. The Base Force’s original focus was on a capabilities-based approach to defense planning, driven largely by resource constraints.² In the early 1990s, threats to the United States were still largely amorphous. The 1992 NMS reflected a capabilities-based, force-planning approach that offered three conceptual conventional force packages. Operation Desert Storm distracted from a completion of this capabilities-based, analytical construct yet at the same time gave a more relevant yardstick with which to justify U.S. force structure and size.

In 1991-1992, Aspin, using U.S. experience in the Persian

Gulf as a backdrop, issued two national security papers that attack capabilities-based force planning and argue that such an approach led to the folly of determining in a vacuum what needed to be done.³ According to Aspin, “It is critical to identify threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them.”⁴ What immediately came about was using the “Iraqi equivalent” as the generic threat measure for regional aggressors and the “Desert Storm equivalent” as the most robust building block for U.S. Armed Forces. The intent was to establish a “clear linkage between the force structure and the sorts of threats the forces could be expected to deal with.”⁵

Aspin’s threat-driven methodology was seen as being flexible enough to include aspects of a typical capabilities-based approach, with the building blocks for the methodology (basically, the Base Force) being generic capabilities. By 1992, Powell was touting the Base Force as a combined threat-based and capabilities-based methodology. Also in 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reported: “The ability to respond to regional and local crises is a key element of our new strategy.”⁶

The 1992 NMS was geared toward fighting and deterring regional rather than global wars. At this stage, the Base Force was still centered on no more than a possible two-

no one is able (or desires) to follow.”¹¹ This is a backlash to what is perceived as U.S. unilateralism.

Revisiting Traditional Strategy and Concepts

Figure 3 shows the strategy and force planning framework that the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) prescribes. The NWC presents a systems approach to strategy and force planning.¹² A systems approach sees the policy process (any policy process) as an interaction of internal processes (point 1) and external influences (considerations) (point 2). Internal factors of the process must be identified and delineated from what is an external consideration affecting the process as an input but in no way defining the process itself.

Where the Clinton strategy focused on resource constraints, the Bush strategy focuses on, or appears to focus on, technology. The inherent risks are a potential failure to maintain a heavy force to contend with a possible conventional, MTW threat (more possible now than ever), and the potential for leaving friend and foe behind in technological innovation (the JV2010 and JV2020 dilemma)—a tendency to privilege go-it-alone strategies (unilateralism) at the expense of commitments to allies, foreign partners, and international organizations.¹³ The risks could be in a turning away from America’s national character (the values and principles that define the Nation) and its obligations to the international community as the self-elected (and consensus-based) global hegemony.

Where the two-MTW construct focused far too much on the fiscal bottom line, the fact that it was conceived of and formulated in a time of crisis and unconstrained resourcing and public support might flaw this

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MRC scenario set, still flexible enough to adequately meet all regional threat possibilities. The 1991-1992 Joint Warfighting Net Assessments (JMNAs) focused on warfighting analyses for an MRC-East, an MRC-Southwest Asia, and an MRC-Korea. The principal focus of these planning exercises was “regional crisis response, including the capability to respond to multiple concurrent major regional contingencies.”⁷ However, according to Powell’s autobiographical recollections, the 1992 NMS focused more on a two-MTW threat: “The Base Force strategy called for Armed Forces capable of fighting two major regional conflicts ‘nearly simultaneously.’”⁸

The Clinton administrations’ October 1993 *Bottom Up Review* followed the combined threat-based, capabilities-based methodology.⁹ However, the ultimate force-sizing criterion became the ability to maintain sufficient forces to be able to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The chief difference in this new defense policy was in the policy’s call for a smaller conventional force posture (10 to 15 percent smaller than the Base Force).¹⁰

The story goes farther, chronicling the evolution from a 2-MRC combined threat, capabilities-driven force-structuring model to the static two-MTW, threat-based, force-sizing construct. The difference is critical, a necessary and sufficient condition for understanding where the two-MTW approach leads to failure and to why and how the new capabilities-based approach might fail on similar grounds for similar reasons.

As originally conceived (a combined threat and a capabilities-focused approach), the Base Force idea provided the appropriate force-structuring paradigm that could further the formulation and implementation of a rational, comprehensive NSS and national policy appropriate for a global power of America’s size and stature. As the approach degraded and transformed into a purely threat-focused model—largely to accommodate domestic concerns with defense dollars and interests in a smaller force—the NSS and the national policy became hostage to a narrow interest in force size (a domestic, defense planning concern that largely ignored the strategic security interests behind the process).

NOTES

1. For more on this, see Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, eds., *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future* (Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project, 2000); Michele A. Flournoy, ed., *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001); Flournoy, *Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2000).

2. Steven Metz, ed., *Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, SSI, 2001).

3. Les Aspin, *National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces*, address before the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 January 1992, 5-6.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and to Congress* (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1992), 8.

7. “The Army Base Force—Not a Smaller Cold War Army” in *Joint Warfighting Net Assessments 1991-1992* (Washington, DC: February 1992).

8. Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

9. Bill Clinton, *Bottom Up Review* (Washington, DC: October 1993).

10. Richard L. Kugler, *Toward a Dangerous World* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 212-13.




Figure 3. Strategy and force planning framework.

new paradigm. The attacks on America on 11 September 2001 profoundly affected the *QDR* process. The crisis opened congressional coffers, and rightfully so. A \$40 billion boost to national defense is significant even in Pentagon terms.¹⁴

Caution is called for, however, when considering that while the crisis presented an opportunity to blue-sky force options, that is, to consider capabilities needed without significant consideration of resource constraints, no such blue-sky approach has occurred with regard to national policy, interests, and strategy in general. That process is even more constrained than before, as the United States seems to be adopting a defensive, adversarial, and some might say even paranoid, strategic posture.

There is little to no significant difference in forces required for a near-simultaneous win over two-MTWs and a win-hold-win approach to the MTW dilemma coupled with an ability to deal with multiple, smaller scale contingencies.¹⁵ An analysis of 1997-1998 and 2002 strategies and force-planning frameworks reveals the following:

- There is no significant difference in the array and types of threats assessed in the latest strategic assessments informing both series of strategy reviews (1997-1998 and 2002).

- There is no significant difference in the type of capabilities prescribed as needed to meet the new threats of the new security environment.

- There are differences in the paradigms (strategic reviews) found in the prioritization of objectives and interests. (Defense of the homeland is now explicitly the top priority; under Clinton it was number 3 or 4 on the list.)

□ A difference was found in the manner of U.S. interaction in the international environment. Under Clinton, a proactive presence, enhanced and buttressed by allied support, defined the strategic posture. Under Bush, creation and preservation of a force capability that allows for a more reactive, defensive, and (if needed) unilateral posture is the *modus operandi*.

The NMS is what U.S. allies, foreign friends, and potential adversaries see and witness in terms of U.S. policy, interests, values, goals, wants, and desires. Official policy might say one thing, but what the United States does is what really matters. In *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*, Richard Neustadt says, "Policy is the art of the possible."¹⁶ And more often than not, what becomes possible is what is enforceable through the use of the military instrument of power. Therefore, how the military is shaped, sized, and implemented becomes the *de facto* U.S. national security policy. That the NMS reflects the Nation's true and full character and its long-term and lasting interests is vital.

In its technology-based approach to U.S. defense and security, the capabilities-based construct could have a damning effect on the Bush administration's NSS by distancing allies and potential friends in the in-

ternational community. This could justify the complaints of potential adversaries of the imperialistic, self-interested character of U.S. hegemony. The RMA and its leap-ahead technological baseline is not a substitute for a comprehensive security strategy.¹⁷

The RMA, capabilities-driven approach revealed in the 2002 *QDR* might create an enormous interoperability gap—a strategic deficit—between U.S. forces and those of allied nations. Many of the technological wonders this new paradigm bases its hopes on have not yet even reached the research and development stage. Those already in the acquisition process will not be fielded for at least another 7 years.¹⁸ Some might not be available until 2020.¹⁹

The current crisis and the open checkbook lead many to conclude that the United States can, in fact, eat its cake and have it too, that it can recapitalize legacy forces and simultaneously resource a leap-ahead to new technologies and capabilities. Caution is in order. Eventually and inevitably, the United States could find itself with plenty of cake, but it might be dining alone. **MR**

The inherent risks [of a predominant focus on technology] are a potential failure to maintain a heavy force to contend with a possible conventional, MTW threat, and the potential for leaving friend and foe behind in technological innovation (the JV2010 and JV2020 dilemma)—a tendency to privilege go-it-alone strategies at the expense of commitments to allies, foreign partners, and international organizations.

NOTES

1. Richmond M. Lloyd, ed., *Strategy and Force Planning* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997), 2.
2. Means refer to capabilities, resources available, and operational and organizational designs. As such, means are equivalent to what we expect to define in the NMS itself (the "how" in the national policy-strategy-implementation process). Regarding means, the question in this essay is referencing changes to the 2002 NMS expected to derive from the adoption of a new, capabilities-based force-sizing/shaping construct. See also *U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 2002) and John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
3. Strategy, in its simplest definition, is a balance of national ends, ways, and means. See also Gaddis; Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982); Lloyd; Michele A. Floumoy, ed., *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001). The articulation of strategy that Gaddis offers accurately defines the issue and appropriately sets the stage for the argument this essay presents. For Gaddis, strategy is "the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources" (viii).
4. *QDR, 2002*.
5. Collected from Steven Metz, ed., *Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2001).
6. Gaddis.
7. For more on the two-MTW construct, see Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996); Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001). See also National Defense University, *Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999).
8. Isaiah Wilson, "Too Little, Too Late: The Dilemma of US Intervention Policy in the Balkan Crises of 1991 to 1995," *World Affairs* (Winter 1999).
9. Campaign 2000 witnessed Al Gore and the Democratic Party championing an incrementalist approach to military force modernization and force development, arguing for maintaining U.S. heavy forces while allocating defense dollars for the acquisition and production of new capabilities. Bush and the Republicans advocated a leap-ahead approach centered on a general abandonment of the legacy force for an investment in future forces, accepting risks during interim years.
10. For a fuller discussion of this array of capabilities, refer to the latest draft of the NMS [as of 27 March 2002].
11. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision (JV) 2010 and 2020*. I attended a workshop in February 2001 at Chatham House (London) that focused on a U.S.-European discussion of NATO and the European Security Defense Initiative/Policy (ESDI/P). Key decisionmakers from both sides of the Atlantic were present. The discussion of the Pentagon's JV2010 and the updated variant, JV2020, was visceral. The perception of the JV plan among America's strongest transatlantic allies is that the JV programmatic was conceived with little regard for European interests in a "full-spectrum dominance" force capability or in Europe's individual or collective capacity to keep pace with the United States in this sort of policy. The provocative sentiment in the ESDI/P was deemed to have been derived from and reflected European reaction to the provocative U.S. posture displayed in the JV idea and a main reason behind recent changes of the growth of a "Fortress Europe v. Fortress America" situation. This, at least, was the sentiment I observed in early 2001.
12. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2d ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1997, 3).
13. JV2010.
14. George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," Washington, D.C., 29 January 2002.
15. NMS 2002 (draft).
16. Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: The Free Press, 1990); David Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
17. Walter Neal Anderson, "Comprehensive Security and a Core Military Capability," in Metz, 165-83.
18. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki has accelerated the acquisition, testing, production, and fielding plan for the Army's Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), the Army's Transformation Force to the Objective Force from an originally planned and programmed 7- to 11-year cycle to a 5- to 7-year cycle. Recent journalistic accounts indicate that the Army plans to deploy the first IBCT to the European Theater in 2007 (Early-Bird reports, week of 1 March 2002).
19. U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force (USAF) systems acquisition cycles are significantly longer than those of the Army. Projections forecast the USAF's F-22 and JSF following acquisition cycles of 15 years.

Major Isaiah Wilson, U.S. Army, is a student at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.P.A., M.A., and a doctorate from Cornell University. He was the 2002 recipient of the George C. Marshall Award at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. His articles have appeared in World Affairs, Political Science Quarterly, and Joint Forces Quarterly.