

The Continuing Influence of Clausewitz

LTC Walter M. Hudson

Instructor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

John Keegan's book *Intelligence and War: Knowledge of the Enemy From Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* can best be described as a thoroughgoing critique of the contemporary fetish for looking at intelligence as a silver bullet that will win battles, capture terrorists, and successfully resolve crises.¹ Keegan casts a skeptic's eye on intelligence. He states, "In the familiar campaigning grounds of Europe, during the great wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic empire (1792-1815), intelligence rarely brought victory solely by its own account."²

The book's central theme is simply that knowledge is not power. Power alone is power, and in a series of eight incisive case studies, framed with introductory and concluding chapters, Keegan seeks to demonstrate this tautology.

The case studies begin in the 19th century with Admiral Horatio Nelson's victory on the Nile and General Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign in 1862. Keegan also cites three 20th-century case studies of naval campaigns or battles, covering the use of wireless in naval engagements in World War I and analyzing the battles of the Atlantic and Midway during World War II. He also looks at the 1941 battle of Crete and the use of human intelligence in the effort to discover Nazi Germany's secret weapons programs. He concludes with a look at developments of military intelligence after 1945, focusing especially on the 1982 Falk-land Islands war.

To Keegan, intelligence is, at best, an enabler; it cannot in itself bring victory. For example, he notes that even during the Spanish Peninsular War, when one would think intelligence would have been of most use, it seldom brought an edge simply

because intelligence traveled too slowly to confer any real-time advantage.³

Even when intelligence is complete, it can be virtually without value. The British possessed near perfect knowledge of what the Germans were going to do in Crete in 1941. Keegan says, "OL 2/302 [the crucial ENIGMA decrypt that revealed German plans] was an almost comprehensive guide to Operation Merkur, one of the most complete pieces of timely intelligence ever to fall into the hands of an enemy.

Merkus revealed the timing of the attack, the objectives, and the strength and composition of the attacking force. Moreover, as the success of Merkur depended on surprise—as all airborne operations must do—the revelation of the operation order to General [Bernard] Freyberg [the Allied commander] was particularly damning."⁴

Nonetheless, the Germans won the battle of Crete. Keegan particularly demonstrates how limited was the value of intelligence before U.S. troops deployed to Iraq. Keegan says, "A potential international law-breaker had been obliged to open his borders to officially sponsored investigators of his suspected wrongdoing and yet they remained unable to dispel the uncertainties surrounding his intentions and capabilities. In absolutely optimum conditions, in short, intelligence had failed."⁵

Rethinking Clausewitz?

Intelligence and War is in many ways a deft and readable book. Keegan powerfully demonstrates the limits of military intelligence in each case study. His narrative skill is evident throughout, and his wonderful one-paragraph description of the Shenandoah Valley could be in an operations order; it is a superb

verbal map, rich in details, yet also clear in exposition.⁶

Keegan can capture a relatively minor figure in history, such as Captain Thomas Troubridge, one of Nelson's favorites, in a few deft strokes. Keegan also has a quiet wit, as for example, when he comments on the scholars who accompanied Napoleon on his campaign to Egypt: "Some of the academics who were to accompany the expedition began to boast, a notorious failing of clever men leading unimportant lives."⁷ The method Keegan uses to prove his thesis is also interesting. It is best described as "Clausewitzian" even though the Prussian philosopher of war is never mentioned in the book. The strange, unanswered questions of *Intelligence and War*, then, are these: has Keegan rethought Carl von Clausewitz, or has he somehow unconsciously appropriated Clausewitz's ideas and insights?

Readers might recall Keegan's 1994 book *A History of Warfare* in which he makes a sweeping attempt to grasp the nature of war.⁸ His thesis is that war is not an instrument of statescraft so much as an expression of culture. In presenting his war-as-cultural expression idea, Keegan also presents his dissent—and outright disdain—for Clausewitz. In the first sentence of the book he asserts: "War is not a continuation of policy by other means."⁹

Keegan goes on to say that in *A History of Warfare* that Clausewitz's influence on military theory and on the course of world events has been disastrous: "The purpose of war was to serve a political end; the nature of war was to serve only itself. By conclusion, his logic ran, those who make war an end to itself are likely to be more successful than those who seek to derate its character for political purposes. The peace of that

most peaceful of century [sic] in European history was held ransom to this subversive idea, which bubbled and seethed like the flux of an active volcano beneath the surface of progress and prosperity."¹⁰

In *Intelligence and War*, however, Keegan proves his thesis regarding the limited utility of using intelligence to win wars by using Clausewitzian language. Keegan states, "Only force finally counts."¹¹ Near the end of the book, he asserts, "War is ultimately about doing, not thinking. The Macedonians beat the Persians at Gaugamela in 331 B.C., not because they took the enemy by surprise . . . but by the ferocity of their onslaught."¹² This sounds much like the Prussian philosopher-general, who believed in defeat by arms through decisive clashes, not through Sun Tzu-like stratagems of trickery and deception, and not through Jominian demonstrations of tactical finesse.

Keegan elsewhere uses language that is even more explicitly Clausewitzian: "War *always* tends toward attrition, which is a *competition* in inflicting and bearing bloodshed, and the nearer attrition approaches to the *extreme*, the less thought counts."¹³ Keegan sounds as if he has adopted a theory of war that might be called "hyper-Clausewitzian." Apparently, Keegan has taken Clausewitz's idea of absolute war—the purely theoretical model that Clausewitz developed to capture the logic of war in the abstract—one step further by assuming this abstract, idealistic notion actually applies to the reality of war.¹⁴ This irony is compounded when one considers that this conflation of absolute war and real war—the thing he attributes to Clausewitz as being pernicious—he seems now to accept.

Keegan and Clausewitz on "Command"

Just as Keegan does, Clausewitz likewise refers to intelligence skeptically: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false; and most are uncertain."¹⁵ This kind of information is inherently "unreliable and transient."¹⁶ Far more important for Clausewitz is the good sense of a commander "guided by the laws of probability" who keeps his head and who must "trust his

judgment and stand like rock on which the waves break in vain."¹⁷ Clausewitz's estimation of intelligence and the role of the commander are consistent with the rest of *On War*. Friction and fog obscure the value of technology. The individual commander's sense, coup d'oeil, and moral courage are far more critical to winning a battle.

In *Intelligence and War*, Keegan views commanders in much the same way as does Clausewitz. Often, Keegan presents two opposing commanders as if they are the only ones who really matter: "In what may be characterized crudely as a personal struggle between [British Prime Minister Winston] Churchill and [German Grand Admiral Karl] Dönitz," Keegan asserts that throughout the battle of the Atlantic (September 1939 to December 1941), "Churchill can . . . be seen to have been outbuilding and outchartering Donitz."¹⁸

An English predilection for seafaring cannot be the only reason why Keegan devotes at least half his book to sea battles. Clearly Keegan uses sea battles because they have always better illustrated head-to-head clashes of wills between individual commanders than have land battles.

The only outright intelligence success Keegan includes in the entire book is his second case study on Jackson's 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Jackson, the epitome of the Clausewitzian commander, is self-contained and Napoleonic. He holds no councils of war with subordinates or staff. He relies on his own judgment, intuition, and innate genius (the coup d'oeil). He masses troops at decisive points. And he clearly recognizes the linkage between war and politics: his soldiers wreak far greater psychological havoc in Washington, D.C., than the size of his force should have allowed.¹⁹

Keegan and the Center of Gravity

The real tactical (and at times strategic) blunders Keegan describes are not, by implicit admission, intelligence failures. They are failures to mass decisively, but more important, they are ultimately failures by commanders to grasp the enemy's center of gravity—the Schwerpunkt

Clausewitz mentions over 50 times in *On War*: "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow."²⁰

Keegan repudiates the Sun Tzu-inspired idea of dispersion and deceit as keys to winning battles and wars. In the sixth case study he notes the needless hypercomplexity of the Japanese operational methods during the Battle of Midway: "They had failed to rid themselves . . . of ancient Asian notions of the value of complexity and diffusion."²¹ Keegan shows that Admiral Osami Nagumo's fate at Midway was not decided by superior U.S. intelligence but by his inability to grasp the enemy's center of gravity.²² Nagumo vacillated over whether the center of gravity was Midway Island or the U.S. fleet that was protecting the island. Clearly it was the latter, especially given that the thrust of Japanese strategy was to destroy the U.S. fleet in the Pacific, not simply to secure the island. At the critical juncture, Nagumo committed the fatal error of diffusion: he sought to attack Midway Island itself. Later, on hearing that the U.S. fleet really was nearby, he compounded his error by trying to take the island and to attack the U.S. fleet simultaneously.²³

In the study of the German Crete campaign in May 1941, Keegan again points out the danger of failing to grasp the Schwerpunkt. The British defenders knew quite well that the Germans were going to invade Crete. They knew when it would occur and what the German order of battle would be. The courageous and resourceful British soldiers were led by General Bernard Freyberg, a man renowned for his personal bravery. Yet, the Germans won. They realized that the center of gravity—the focal point to the entire airborne assault—was Maleme airfield. They fought ruthlessly to secure it, going so far as to make nearly suicidal crash landings of glider troops onto it. Freyberg and his subordinates, who lacked that ruthless clarity, abandoned the airfield and, in so doing, lost the island. Keegan writes, "[A] defending force . . . however well informed it may be of the general risk, is at a

disadvantage against an enemy who has his aim clearly in mind.”²⁴

A Clausewitzian Critique

Intelligence and War is an effective, even powerful critique of the current craving after technological gimmicks and James Bond-like ploys that will somehow save the United States and its Allies from peril or destruction. In Keegan’s analysis, what matters more than technology is a commander’s unique abilities, the use of sheer force, and the ability to mass that force decisively at the right place to force defeat. Keegan does not argue that these are outdated or quaint notions of a rapidly fading world of nation-states. Keegan could have argued, contra Clausewitz, that individual military prowess counts less than a variety of impersonal forces; that cultural factors play a greater role than a commander’s will; that or deception and cunning mean as much as brute force and relentlessness. But he does not.

Debunking Clausewitz and his ideas has been a cottage industry

for the past 10 years or so.²⁵ But at least in *Intelligence and War* the Prussian general’s ideas are set forth by one of his most noted detractors. Whether Keegan has changed his mind about Clausewitz or not, his book can certainly be called “Clausewitzian.” **MR**

NOTES

1. John Keegan, *Intelligence and War: Knowledge of the Enemy From Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).
2. *Ibid.*, 15.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, 169.
5. *Ibid.*, 315.
6. *Ibid.*, 74.
7. *Ibid.*, 45.
8. Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 3.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 21-22.
11. Keegan, *Intelligence and War*, 349.
12. *Ibid.*, 321.
13. Keegan, *Intelligence and War*, 321.
14. *Ibid.*, 228-30. Keegan might be considered a disciple of Clausewitz as interpreted by the military scholar Azar Gat in *The Origins of Military Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Gat contends that Clausewitz’s aim in writing *On War* was to create a text for annihilative warfare and that he held absolute war as a conceptualization that did not simply exist in the mind but as a *potentiality* a commander should strive for. But if Clausewitz advocated such “knockout” wars, why all the distinction in *On War* between absolute and real war? And why the insistence that war had to vary with the political objective and that war for limited objectives was a limited form?
15. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 117.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. Keegan, *Intelligence and War*, 244.
19. *On War*, 102. In Clausewitz’s discussion of military genius, he says “Coup d’oeil therefore refers not alone to the physical but, more commonly, to the inward eye. . . . Stripped of metaphor and of the restrictions imposed on it by the phrase, the concept merely refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.”
20. *Ibid.*, 485.
21. Keegan, *Intelligence and War*, 208.
22. I am cognizant of the current debate over the application of centers of gravity in U.S. warfighting doctrine. Claiming no expertise whatever, I rely on LTC Antulio Echevarria II’s essay, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,” *Naval War College Review* (Winter 2003): 118, for providing focus to my thoughts on the subject.
23. Keegan, *Intelligence and War*, 213.
24. *Ibid.*, 179.
25. The “unholy trinity” of Clausewitz debunkers are Keegan, Martin van Creveld, in *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), and Edward Luttwak, in “Towards Post-Heroic Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 1995): 109-22. These three are the most famous military scholars to have publicly attacked Clausewitz. Van Creveld’s *The Transformation of War* was a dramatic reversal of his previous stance on Clausewitz. See Michael I. Handel, ed., “The Eternal Clausewitz,” *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1986). Luttwak’s newer stance is quite in contrast with much of his previous work, especially *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1987).

Other writers, less known in the fields of military history and scholarship, also have joined in what one might call a revisionist chorus, perhaps taking their cues from the work of the above scholars. For example, in *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1997.), journalist Barbara Ehrenreich dismisses Clausewitz on the first page for conceiving war as a rational act (the same page, interestingly enough, that has an epigraph from *The Transformation of War*). She says, “The Napoleonic Wars, which bore along with them the rationalist spirit of the French Revolution, inspired the Prussian officer Carl von Clausewitz to propose that war itself is an entirely rational undertaking, unswayed by human emotion” (7). Anyone with even an elementary understanding of Clausewitz can see however, that Clausewitz did not propose this at all. He states early on in *On War* that “it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion” (76).

McClerland: Politician in Uniform

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr.

U.S. Army, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Kiper, U.S. Army, Retired, has won two prestigious awards for his book *Major General John Alexander McClerland: Politician in Uniform* (Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1999). He received the 1999 Fletcher Pratt Literary Award for the best nonfiction book about the Civil War and the 1999-2000 Alexander McClurg Award for the best publication about Illinois in the Civil War.

Kiper’s book fills an important gap in the history of the Civil War, and the Fletcher Pratt award is certainly well deserved. The book, which is informative and well researched, chronicles and analyzes McClerland’s war service.

Voted by war scholars as one of the 10 ugliest (in appearance) Union generals, McClerland succeeded remarkably well for a politician cum soldier, who disproved the maxim that “war is too serious an endeavor for amateurs.” McClerland did extremely

well for an amateur. He secured his commission as a senior leader solely through political connections in Illinois. He had no prior military training as a leader and had seen only minimal service during the Black Hawk war.

McClerland reputedly organized and led his brigade, division, and finally, corps in skirmishes and battles of the Western Theater. Within 5 months of the beginning of hostilities, McClerland had achieved the rank of brigadier general. In light of the times and the rapid growth of the U.S. Army, this was not unusual, but his penchant for political mannerisms irritated his peers and senior officers, who resented McClerland’s Illinois connections to President Abraham Lincoln.

A seemingly “fast study,” McClerland quickly picked up the science of war. However, his inability to master the art of military customs and traditions caused him to make

enemies outside his immediate command and precipitated massive problems with his commander, General Ulysses S. Grant, who held McClerland in low esteem.

McClerland believed a West Point cabal was responsible for many of his difficulties. Kiper, a West Point graduate himself, provides a balanced and fair view of how West Pointers obviously did much to stifle and ruin McClerland’s career. Using strong circumstantial evidence, Kiper shows that, for not so thinly veiled military reasons, Grant and Generals William Tecumseh Sherman and James Birdseye McPherson were out to rid the Army of McClerland.

The book’s strength is its insightful analyses and its extensive bibliography. Kiper offers perspectives that only seasoned soldiers can have. His insight into tactical and operational decisions is rather unique in bibliographical works of Civil War generals. Kiper aptly shows that

McClelland, even though he was largely successful on the battlefield, made some bad decisions off the battlefield. His constant correspondence to Washington, D.C., aggravated Lincoln and Secretary of War Henry Stanton, who often did not respond to McClelland's messages, and produced the opposite reactions than McClelland had intended. McClelland's bitter recriminations about how he was treated garnered little support from Stanton or Lincoln who, in true political form, "hung McClelland out to dry."

Kiper's in-depth coverage of McClelland's corps during the Vicksburg Campaign, which became McClelland's undoing, is the highlight of the book. McClelland's inability to practice humility and hold

his tongue precipitated his relief. Grant made no apology for removing McClelland and promptly replaced him with a West Pointer, which only bolstered McClelland's sense of paranoia. With his reputation tarnished, McClelland eventually regained command of his corps, leading it during minor actions in Louisiana and Texas before he became so seriously ill that he had to be replaced.

Had McClelland been able to muzzle his ego, he might have become one of the war's more outstanding Union generals. McClelland's unbridled ambition is no different from that displayed by some senior officers today. Yet, his lack of humility and over-zealous desire to be his own best advocate provides ex-

cellent lessons to those who wish to advance their careers through self-aggrandizement. His downfall came when he violated chain-of-command prerogatives once too often. Grant became his lifelong adversary, and like Grant's other nemesis, General William Starke Rosecrans, a fellow West Pointer, McClelland's wartime service is not remembered for its successes as much as for its failures.

The U.S. Army has changed substantially since the Civil War, and full-time professional soldiers continue to be the foundation of a professional military. However, Kiper's book shows that McClelland's citizen-soldier traits of volunteerism and patriotism are also important to the success of the nation's military.

MR Bookshelf

Suggested Reading for Military Professionals

Major Dennis P. Chapman
U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

The U.S. Marine Corps' book, *Warfighting*, tells us that "Self-study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance—and should receive at least equal time—to maintaining physical condition . . . after all, an officer's principal weapon is his mind."¹

During my recent work as an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Michigan State University (MSU), I compiled a short, annotated bibliography that could be of interest to military professionals, especially junior officers. While at MSU I sought to foster in cadets an interest in continuing intellectual growth and development through professional reading. I discovered that from the cadet's perspective, the pool of professional material is rather limited and aimed at a mass audience. Most offer little intellectual content or literary value. To bridge the gap, I gave the students a professional reading list drawn from books that I found useful.

Learning to track down good books takes practice, especially on topics of interest to Army officers.

But the most important reason for not being able to find good military-related material is the officer corps' unintentional reticence to share what we learn from our professional reading and study. In this omission, we forfeit much of what we might gain from our efforts.

The reading itself is not where the chief benefit lies; it is in the subsequent development of what we read through discussion and debate with our peers. In the words of Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Dialogue and debate, especially in times of dynamic change, are indispensable for developing and refining ideas. From these debates spring the seeds of change. [O]nly through a reasoned and vigorous give-and-take will we be able to refine the ideas that are vital to the continued evolution of our army as we prepare for war in the twenty-first century."²

This bibliography is not definitive of course. There are thousands of valuable books available to military professionals. My aim is to encourage young officers to get into the

habit of lifelong learning. I also want to offer readers a different perspective on a few familiar titles as well as others that might otherwise escape the reader's notice.³

In the superb book **Just and Unjust Wars**, Michael Walzer proceeds from an essentially antiwar position rooted in opposition to the Vietnam war.⁴ Nonetheless, Walzer's incisive analysis of the ethics of war gets to the heart of profoundly important ideas about the moral and ethical considerations in the conduct of warfare. Some of us have already reached and accepted some of his conclusions on an intuitive level. Whether you agree with his arguments or not, this book is still valuable because it enunciates his ideas in a clear, concise, thought-provoking form that is accessible and useful, not just to legal scholars and philosophers, but to the thoughtful, informed layman as well.

Victor Suvorov, a Soviet defector using a pseudonym, wrote **Inside the Soviet Army**, published in 1982, in the bitterly disillusioned tone

of a one-time true believer who discovers that his cause has been a sham.⁵ This readable and interesting account gives a vivid, inside view of a major military force founded on premises alien to the American military tradition but which suited the political system and society it served. Suvorov depicts an organization where noble ideals and high standards suffocate under the weight of hard-nosed pragmatism at best and corrupt, cynical opportunism at worst. Suvorov concludes with a plaintive cry for the citizens of the West to awaken to the steadily encroaching power of the Soviet Union. Despite being overtaken by events, this book is still worth reading.

The Fight for the 'Malvinas': The Argentine Forces in the Falklands, by Martin Middlebrook, is an unusual book that tells the story of the Falklands war from the Argentine perspective.⁶ The book exposes the ineptitude of senior Argentine leaders during the war (particularly that of the high command in charge on the islands) while serving as a poignant tribute to the loyalty, courage, and dedication of the junior officers who struggled to lead their men under abysmal circumstances. The ineffective efforts of Argentine ground forces in the face of the invading British demonstrate the limited utility of pitting short-service conscripts against well-trained regular forces. The bumbling performance of the senior Argentine leaders, preoccupied with domestic politics since seizing power in 1976, demonstrates that Argentine Armed Forces had lost their fighting edge. They had to learn the hard way what Denis Hart Mahan, Dean of Engineering at West Point, taught in the early days of the Republic: officers who involve themselves in politics will not have the time they need to maintain their professional competence.

Platoon Leader, by James R. McDonough, is a vivid memoir of small-unit leadership in Vietnam.⁷ This classic book describes the coming of age of a lieutenant fresh from West Point as leader of an infantry platoon in Vietnam. Refreshing in its honesty, and a wonderful resource for every aspiring leader, this book is important

for all young officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

Once A Warrior King, by David Donovan, is a great companion to *Platoon Leader*.⁸ The book tells the story of a lieutenant serving as a military adviser to local militia forces in a South Vietnamese district. As the highest-ranking American in the area, he faces extremely complex military and political challenges. Another refreshingly honest and inspiring memoir, this book is highly recommended for young officers and NCOs.

Inside the VC and NVA, by Michael Lee Lanning and Dann Cragg, is an account of the Vietnam war from the North Vietnamese perspective.⁹ This book is surprising in that it reveals an important similarity between America and its erstwhile opponents. In popular imagination, we understandably impute to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) traits attributable to the communist system that it served—cynicism, brutality, and callous indifference to the suffering of its servants. Yet in their vivid and detailed descriptions of life among the ranks of the NVA, Lanning and Cragg produce a vision, not of an army driven by a set of remote and hard-hearted ideological zealots indifferent to the suffering of their men, but rather one characterized by a strong bond between leader and led, whose officers were imbued with a deep concern for the comfort, safety, and well-being of their soldiers. Lanning and Cragg demonstrate that this is one feature that America and its former enemies hold in common.

Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army, by Earnest F. Fisher, Jr., is one of the few histories of the U.S. Army NCO corps.¹⁰ He traces the corps' evolution from when NCOs were appointed or dismissed at the commander's whim to today, when NCOs are centrally selected and hold their rank permanently. Today's NCOs enjoy the benefits of formal professional education and training programs to prepare them for increasing responsibility, and they are recognized by their commissioned colleagues as full-fledged professionals

in their own right.

The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960, by Noel Barber, is the story of Great Britain's triumph in Malaya over the Cold War's first communist insurgency.¹¹ Barber describes the bitter 12-year struggle that involved mostly police, politicians, and propagandists who were dealt decisive blows in what was mostly a political struggle, while conventional military forces played a supporting role.

Bob Woodward's book, **The Commanders**, is about the tension during the 1991 Persian Gulf war between the forces of bureaucratic inertia on one hand and moral and political vision on the other.¹² Woodward's most striking revelation is that in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, virtually no one, including such luminaries as then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and former Secretary of State James Baker, wanted to act. Although President George H. W. Bush's advisers were content to rely on such routine measures as diplomatic condemnation and economic sanctions in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, only Bush had the vision to fully comprehend the moral significance of the Iraqi invasion or to envision action on a scale grand enough to reverse it. While military leaders, including Powell and Admiral William J. Crowe, framed their reservations and concerns in terms of potential U.S. casualties, one wonders if they were not motivated as much by a reluctance to upset the diplomatic routine—an orderly progression of events to which they were accustomed—as by not wanting to move beyond their comfort zones. In politics, as in physics, a body at rest tends to remain at rest unless forced into motion by a leader's clearly articulated and vigorously pursued vision.¹³

When **U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941**, by Andrew J. Birtle, was first published in 1998, the United States was still adjusting to the dangerous realities of a new and unstable post-Cold War world.¹⁴ At that time it was ar-

gued that the peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and domestic support missions being assigned to the military with increasing frequency were distracting the military from its traditional role of defeating enemies on conventional battlefields. Birtle's work shows that, far from being a new phenomenon, the Army has been deeply involved in stability and support operations since the founding of the Republic. The military routinely conducted an array of missions, such as administering civil government in the occupied South following the Civil War; rebuilding physical infrastructure and conducting political institutions in Cuba and the Philippines; or conducting counterinsurgency and constabulary operations on the Western frontier and across the globe. Birtle demonstrates that the proliferation of such missions since the Cold War is unusual; rather, it is the United States' intense Cold War focus on preparing for large-scale conventional war that is the true historical anomaly.

Robert R. Leonhard's innovative book **Principles of War for the Information Age** proposes a radical change to the intellectual underpinnings of the military profession.¹⁵ Criticizing the nine traditional principles of war (maneuver, offensive, mass, economy of force, objective, security, simplicity, surprise, and unity of command) as contradictory and obsolete, Leonhard proposes their abandonment. He offers instead a new philosophical system derived from three laws of war: the law of humanity, the law of economy, and the law of duality. His new principles of war, which would support the three laws of war, would include—

- The independent principle of knowledge and ignorance.
- Two principles of aggression (dislocation and confrontation, and distribution and concentration).
- Two principles of interaction (opportunity and reaction, and activity and security).
- Two principles of control (option acceleration and objective, and command and anarchy).

In **The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military Tradition**, John Stone catalogues the lengthy list of predictions

made since World War I of the imminent demise of the main battle tank.¹⁶ After carefully exposing the flaws that made these predictions premature, Stone rather surprisingly adds his own proclamations of the end of the tank. Conceding the near omnipotence in the tactical fight of monstrous machines like the M1 Abrams, Stone argues that the sources of its strength—massive firepower, nearly invulnerable armor, and great tactical mobility—carry the seeds of its demise. The reason? Weight. According to Stone, the hardware that makes this tactical prowess possible comes with a weight penalty so large that it actually detracts from the tank's operational effectiveness, decreases its road speed, restricts its movement to routes whose roads and bridges can bear its gigantic mass, and creates fuel-guzzling proclivities that tie the tank to an increasingly short logistical leash.

Former Secretary of the Navy James Webb's book, **A Sense of Honor**, is set in the U.S. Naval Academy at the time of the Tet Offensive in 1968.¹⁷ The book describes the struggles midshipmen faced at the U.S. Naval Academy amidst the turmoil of the Vietnam war. Webb depicts the physical abuse of plebes at the hands of upperclassmen, a practice that has been abolished, but he still vividly captures the sense of honor that pervades U.S. service academies.

In C.S. Forester's classic tale **Rifleman Dodd**, set during the Peninsular wars in Portugal during Napoleon's reign, Dodd, a British soldier, finds himself cut off from his regiment.¹⁸ He attaches himself to the local inhabitants and, with and without their help, proceeds to wreak havoc in the rear area of the French army. Aside from its entertainment value, the book offers at least two insights to the professional military officer. First, it establishes the historicity of asymmetrical warfare, particularly the friction that a few guerrillas pose for a conventional army dependant on a long logistical tail. Second, it serves as a reminder of the tragic toll war takes on innocents who find themselves caught in the crossfire between contending armies.

Another riveting tale by C.S. Forester, **The Gun**, also depicts the nature of guerrilla warfare against Napoleon's army in Spain.¹⁹ The book's value lies in its harrowing depiction of the havoc a guerrilla war can inflict on the society in whose midst it is fought, shredding the fabric of society; destroying personal, professional, and economic relationships; and creating a political vacuum into which rush a hoard of warlords, gangsters, bandits, and every variety of thug. Anyone seeking to understand what the brutish existence of the Afghan people must have been like after the Soviet invasion of 1979 need look no further than the terrifying vision of war and the resultant anarchy, chaos, and turmoil depicted in this book.

Originally published in 1931, **The Rise of U.S. Grant**, by Arthur L. Conger, is a unique book that takes a different and illuminating approach to the study of Union General and President Ulysses S. Grant.²⁰ Where other books focus on Grant's great victories, his titanic struggle with Confederate General Robert E. Lee, his drinking, or the purported dichotomy between his brilliant successes in the field and his supposed failings as President, this book examines Grant's development and growth as a military commander during the crucial early years of the Civil War. Focusing largely on Grant's career in the West, Conger carefully examines Grant's rise through the ranks, from the time of his appointment through his command of the 21st Illinois, his promotion to brigadier, and his actions at Belmont, Henry, Donelson, Shiloh, and Vicksburg. Conger's work stands apart, however, in its tight focus, not on what Grant did at each key juncture, but on what he learned and how he applied these lessons to future actions.

Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, by Wayne P. Hughes, is an excellent book that offers key insights into the nature of war at sea, particularly as it differs from war on land.²¹ Hughes describes naval combat as wholly attrition-based, its fundamental imperative being to "attack effectively first." In support of these observations, Hughes introduces us to Lancaster's Square Law, which

postulates that a small advantage in firepower coupled with an effective first attack produces a decisive result. Also of interest to military audiences is Hughes's assertion of the ascendancy of the offense and corresponding untenability of the defense at sea and the inapplicability to naval warfare of the concept of maintaining a tactical reserve.

Each of these books is entertaining and food for thought. Although my stated mission is to bring these works to the attention of junior officers, any reader will find them instructive. **MR**

NOTES

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3. For information on out-of-print books, see on-line at <www.bookfinder.com>, <www.barnesandnoble.com>, or <www.amazon.com>.
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5. Victor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1982).
6. Martin Middlebrook, *The Fight for the Malvinas: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands* (London: Viking, 1989).
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8. David Donovan, *Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986); McDonough.
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13. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 343.
14. Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998).
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18. C.S. Forester, *Riflemen Dodd* (Mount Pleasant, SC: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1990).
19. C.S. Forester, *Riflemen Dodd and The Gun* (New York: The Press of the Reader's Club, 1942).
20. Arthur L. Conger, *The Rise of U.S. Grant* (New York: DaCapo Press, 1996).
21. Wayne P. Hughes, *Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986).

MR Book Reviews

A FRATERNITY OF ARMS: America and France in the Great War, Robert B. Bruce, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2003, 400 pages, \$39.95.

In this era of fear and loathing of all things French, it is wise to pull back from the contemporary rancor and examine the historic events that unite and divide France and the United States. In *A Fraternity of Arms*, Robert B. Bruce explores the relations between the two nations during World War I. Bruce argues that France was America's most important coalition partner and supplied the U.S. Army with much of the weapons and training that the United States required to fight a modern war. He also notes that military necessity and mutual respect forged a martial bond between the United States and the French that proved decisive to the defeat of Imperial Germany.

When the United States entered the war in April 1917 the Army was ill-prepared to fight a modern war. Bruce points out that the United States not only lacked tanks, machine guns, artillery, modern aircraft, and the other tools of industrial warfare, it also lacked the know-how to employ these weapons effectively. The French, weakened by 3 years of heavy casualties, the "mutinies" of 1917, and an increasingly war-weary population, gladly offered the United

States their weaponry and expertise in the hope that the U.S. Army would boost French morale and help turn the tide of the war.

On arrival in France, most U.S. combat units received training on their new French weapons and were then "seasoned" to combat by serving with French divisions on quiet sectors of the front. Bruce notes that U.S. General John J. Pershing disagreed with French infantry doctrine and Allied efforts to amalgamate U.S. units into existing French and British formations. But, for the most part, France and the United States benefited from their mutual equipment, training, and assignment arrangements. Bruce also notes that the French were so anxious to see the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) succeed that they provided some of their own divisions, tank units, and aviation squadrons to support the U.S. Army's St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives.

While military necessity pulled France and the United States together, the alliance was truly cemented by the mutual regard and affection that the soldiers and officers of both nations held for one another. Bruce argues that shared democratic beliefs, the common heritage of the American Revolution, and the respect for each other's martial virtues welded the Franco-American

coalition into the fraternity of arms that defeated Germany.

Although Bruce is absolutely correct in noting the importance of the symbiotic relationship that developed between the American and French armies during World War I, his argument that the doughboys were generally enamored with France is a bit too overstated. Many Americans certainly liked the French, but there is ample evidence to suggest that an equal number believed that their Allies were rapacious, backward, and ungrateful. Some Americans certainly agreed with Private Ira Wilkinson's observation that France is surely God's country—because he is about the only one [who] would have it . . . , except the Frenchmen." AEF General Hunter Liggett later characterized the doughboys' relations with the French as a "broken romance" and stated that "France itself was a sorry disillusionment to the American soldier."

Despite these shortcomings, *A Fraternity of Arms* is an excellent work that should be studied by anyone interested in World War I, Franco-American relations, or coalition warfare. Bruce has succeeded in highlighting the vital role that France played in ensuring the viability and success of the AEF.

**LTC Richard S. Faulkner, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

SEALED WITH BLOOD: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America, Sarah J. Purcell, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2002, 276 pages, \$35.00.

Sarah J. Purcell's book, as a work on the idea of public memory, establishes how Revolutionary War heroes were integrated into the burgeoning political culture of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. This is no small task, because many consider political culture an area that is soft among a soft science like history and has a tendency to scare people off.

Purcell uses numerous sources to buttress her arguments in favor of the idea of Revolutionary War heroes and their effect on the early years of the United States. She specifically discusses "Palmetto Day" in Charleston, South Carolina, and annual events in Bennington, Vermont.

Purcell also writes about some of those who fell during the Revolutionary War, such as Doctor Joseph Warren, who died at Bunker Hill, and Richard Montgomery, who died during the Quebec Campaign. Purcell even strives to assimilate the roles of women and Blacks in the Revolutionary War, putting special emphasis on Marquis de Lafayette's recognition of African-American soldiers.

The main problem with the book is that Purcell fails to draw a line where Revolutionary War heroics end. She mentions the quasi-war with France and the battles in the Mediterranean against various Barbary states, and she even discusses the War of 1812, if only to denigrate its personalities.

Purcell does not, however, clearly establish any criteria for what she considers the ending point of the Revolutionary War or who she includes, which often leads to glaring omissions. For example, Stephen Decatur gained much notoriety as a Naval officer fighting Barbary pirates in 1801 when he led a daring raid to burn the captured USS *Philadelphia*. Decatur went on to fight in the War of 1812 and serve on the Board of Naval Commissioners. Many towns in the United States are named after Decatur, yet he is mentioned only in passing, and nothing is offered about his role in expanding a patriotic political culture.

Overall, *Sealed With Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America*, organized chronologically, is well written, flows with logic, and is well worth reading, especially for its political culture consideration and its look at the role of gender and race in the Revolutionary War.

CPL David J. Schepp, USA,
Fort Benning, Georgia

RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH—American Poems of the Great War, Mark W. Van Wienan, ed., University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 2002, 368 pages, \$44.95.

*We owe the future
the past, the long knowledge
that is the potency of time to come.*

These words from the poem *At a Country Funeral*, by Wendell Berry, are included in the wealth of obscure poetry that English professor Mark W. Van Wienan presents in the anthology *Rendezvous With Death—American Poems of the Great War*. This poem underscores an explicit U.S. response to "the push and pull of political commitments" of a society coming to grips with a war that irrevocably ended the last vestiges of international isolationism. In this anthology, Van Wienan expands on his earlier work, *Partisans and Poets: The Political Work of American Poetry in the Great War* (Cambridge, New York, 1997).

Before America declared war against the Central Powers, it had inherited Britain's Kiplingesque belief that the Great War was being waged for the survival of the entire civilized world. Yet, many Americans were noninterventionists, or outright pacifists, believing that the country should not support the Allies until the rights of the oppressed at home were satisfied.

Whatever modern readers determined about the aesthetic and literary quality of these poems, a high percentage of them tethered debates surrounding U.S. intervention to women's suffrage, international socialism, civil rights, workers quality of life, the cause of world peace, and militarism. Therefore, this poetic outpouring must be seen in its cultural and social context, for how else can Americans today make sense of poems supporting such causes or call-

ing for patriotic knitting, food conservation, or expressing simplistic "jingoism" and angry polemics?

Van Wienan reminds us that the poems of those war years were evaluated not for literary quality but for their partisanship. Still, today's readers will find many of them quite good, their subject matter transcending the age in which they were written—an age where newspapers, booklets, pamphlets, and journals became the exigent tools of a poetry that rose from all levels of society.

Some American female poets are not included in Van Wienan's anthology, but their exclusion might be because they were expatriates or were otherwise obscure. Nosheen Khan's, *Woman's Poetry of the First World War* (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1998) includes many of those Van Wienan excluded.

The broad themes of the 150 poems of this anthology touch on issues still relevant today—institutionalized violence, political repression, militarism, and international relations. I agree with Van Wienan's assessment that the most important legacy of these poems is the war's dissident voices, since in them lies the true expression of American pluralism and democratic tolerance. This fact alone makes this book a valuable contribution to the study of war-time poetry.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF,
Ramstein Air Base, Germany

MASKING TERROR: How Women Contain Violence in Southern Sri Lanka, Alex Argenti-Pillen, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2003, 240 pages, \$49.95.

Masking Terror: How Women Contain Violence in Southern Sri Lanka, by Alex Argenti-Pillen, is a study of how discursive styles in social interaction serve to influence violence in southern Sri Lanka. Udahenagama (hill-garden village) is a pseudonym for a conglomerate of five neighborhoods where Argenti-Pillen conducted fieldwork with the support of a team of research assistants and interpreters. The primary audience for this book is for academics, mental health professionals, and humanitarian workers.

The methodology of the work draws on postmodernist approaches, which leads to a suspicion of modern knowledge, such as Western trauma methods and an acceptance of indigenous superstition at face value. This in turn leads to interesting conclusions, such as the distinction between modernist violence directed at a universal enemy and the traditional violence of Udahenagama, which is rooted in context and particularity. The significance of this conclusion is that ethnic hatred is not the source of violence in Sri Lanka (and perhaps other conflict zones); rather, the militarized state, created through propaganda campaigns and other means, is the setting for large-scale violence. Ultimately, however, this methodology might have more resonance with academics in research than with military practitioners in the field.

Argentiti-Pillen's exploration of discourse on violence in the five neighborhoods provides an opportunity to see indigenous natives as people in a context rather than as "exoticized others." After relating various situations (mostly superstitions) and ways of coping with them, *Masking Terror* discusses discursive strategies, including ambiguity, such as the use of the referential pronouns "these" and "that," and distance in reported speech—keeping one's own voice distinct from the source of reported information.

The author is critical of mental health nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including NGOs that focus on the Western concept of political versus domestic violence, and thereby, limit services; the reliance on Western discursive techniques in counseling (structured conversation with eye-contact, sitting face-to-face, and the use of touch); and most significant, the introduction of a sense of facelessness that might ultimately prolong the violence cycle by removing constraining factors identified in Udahenagaman field work.

One of the book's major arguments is that modern trauma discourse leads to the destabilization of the containment of violence by eroding the basis of local, cautious discourses. This ethnography is a contribution to the existing literature

on Sri Lanka and traditional ways that women contain violence in non-Western societies. The book is probably not required reading for the military professional, but for those interested in these topics. My skepticism of postmodernist methodology, the book is authoritative, well-written, and supported by in-depth and quality research.

**CPT Matthew J. Morgan, USA,
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii**

LICENSED TO SPY: With the Top Secret Military Liaison Mission in East Germany, John A. Fahey, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2002, 209 pages, \$25.95.

To old Cold War warriors, Berlin duty had a particular appeal. Berlin, once located 110 miles inside East Germany and in the middle of 22 Soviet divisions, gave an immediacy and sharper focus to soldiering. A small group of skilled military personnel had even closer contact with the Soviets. Some 14 officers and men were assigned as part of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany. They lived outside Berlin in the city of Potsdam and performed various liaison functions for Soviet and U.S. theater commanders and, unofficially, collected information throughout East Germany.

Information-collection was dangerous, and sometimes USMLM vehicles came back with crushed fenders or as burnt-out hulls. In 1985, a Soviet soldier shot USMLM Major Arthur (Nick) Nicholson. The Soviet general who arrived on the scene deliberately denied first aid to Nicholson, and Nicholson bled to death.

Normally, USMLM officers spoke Russian, and the enlisted drivers spoke German. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission was stationed in Frankfurt, West Germany, and the British and French Military Liaison Missions were stationed outside of Berlin.

During 1960 and 1961, Commander John A. Fahey was assigned to the USMLM. Fahey was a U.S. Navy officer with an extensive Russian-language background. As the sole Navy officer in an organization primarily staffed with Army and Air Force per-

sonnel, he had little Naval information to gather, but he helped in the Army effort.

While Fahey was evidently an effective gatherer, he was also a fish out of water. Much of the book catalogs his complaints about various Army officers, Army regulations, control of enlisted drivers, military police, and wearing the uniform. When Fahey is not complaining, he provides a good deal of information. He discusses some tradecraft, detentions (arrests) by the Soviets (in which he led the mission), and history. He had his share of surviving dangerous car crashes, being shot at, escaping a burning automobile, and he was a direct observer at an important time of Cold War history—the erection of the Berlin Wall.

Fahey's book is not the first about the mission, but it is the only book in print. Written in the 1950s-style of *Argosy* magazine, it is author-centric but easy to read. *Licensed to Spy* is a good look at a hush-hush organization that did a great job for the United States. Perhaps more books about the USMLM will follow in time.

**LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE WORLD WAR II 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Figures of the Second World War, Howard J. Langer, Career Press, Inc., Franklin Lakes, NJ, 2002, 333 pages, \$27.99.

Who were the 100 most influential figures of World War II? This simple question immediately sends one in search of pencil and paper. Howard J. Langer gives the answers in *The World War II 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Figures of the Second World War*.

Langer, a noted author and journalist, gives readers three precursors before they review and analyze his list. First, the word "influential" is defined as having the power to bring about change. Second, he pleads guilty to seeing things as an American and is understandably biased. Finally, he will listen to anyone's argument about his ranking from 9 to 100. However, if 1 through 8 are debated, he will turn a deaf ear.

The people who comprise Langer's list are truly an eclectic group, running the gamut from civil-

ian and military leaders to scientists and inventors to journalists and chaplains. Langer does justice to each person on his list by presenting a well-researched and well-written vignette of that person's career. He then justifies why the person deserves his position on the list. Langer's book, which certainly inspires interesting debate and begs curiosity, gives the reader hours of enjoyable reading.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ANOTHER VIETNAM: Pictures of the War From the Other Side, Tim Page, Douglas Niven, Christopher Riley, eds., National Geographic, Washington, DC, 2002, 240 pages, \$50.00.

In *Another Vietnam: Pictures of the War From the Other Side*, the editors, who were combat photographers during the Vietnam war, contacted their counterparts in the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and rescued unpublished images that showed the other side of the war. Photos range from troupes of entertainers to combat footage. The book is valuable because of the rarity of its subject; one source shot only 70 individual pictures during the entire course of the war.

The truly interesting aspect of the book is that the editors believe that since their sources were also combat photographers, they shared a worldview and purpose. The U.S. photographers were accustomed to conveying the war's reality. The Vietcong and NVA photographers were trained under a socialist-realist school and sought to convey the party's view of reality. Even the combat photos show heroic, ever-victorious revolutionaries. There are no pictures of dead Vietcong, except for the obligatory dead child. This is not to suggest that the photos were staged, only that the photographers were trained to produce only photos that supported the propaganda message. These images were the major weapon of the enemy forces. The editors seem to fail to understand them in that context.

Kevin L. Jamison, Attorney at Law,
Gladstone, Missouri

THE CONQUERORS: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945, Michael Beschloss, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002, 377 pages, \$26.95.

The latest work of Michael Beschloss, America's leading presidential historian, is *The Conquerors: Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945*. Beschloss illuminates the political maneuvering in Washington, D.C., when the United States was waging war against Nazi Germany. Although Beschloss began writing the book in 1991, he waited for the opening of Winston Churchill's papers and archives from the newly defunct Soviet Union before he continued. His delay is our gain.

Using powerful minibiographies, Beschloss provides an unmatched look into the personalities of the key players. Although the information that Beschloss provides is little different from other accounts of the events, he manages to weave the various threads into a single coherent narrative. Written for the educated, informed individual, the book does not get bogged down in dry information.

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury and long-time friend of Roosevelt, was little concerned with Jewish issues until his aide, Henrietta Klotz, forced him to come to grips with his own Jewish heritage. Morgenthau risked his close relationship with Roosevelt by asking the President to do something about the atrocities against the European Jews. Roosevelt had long known about the atrocities and finally admitted to the Nation that "the wholesale, systematic murder of the Jews of Europe goes on unabated every hour." The Morgenthau Plan, a draconian measure, would have converted the industrial nation of Germany into a totally agricultural nation. Secretary of War Henry Stimson vigorously and successfully opposed Morgenthau's proposals.

Although then Vice President Harry Truman's name is included in the title, he was not a main actor in events until late in the war. A more accurate title would have mentioned Morgenthau's name since he and Roosevelt are the focus of the

book. Despite these quibbles, *The Conquerors* is a real contribution to understanding Roosevelt's true views of Jews and the events that led to a peaceful, democratic Germany. For most readers it will undoubtedly be a real page turner.

Glen F. Welch,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LOST OVER LAOS: A True Story of Tragedy, Mystery, and Friendship, Richard Pyle and Horst Faas, Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003, 304 pages, \$30.00.

Take a minor footnote uncovered in U.S. military archives—a mere scrap of paper pinpointing a 1971 helicopter crash in Laos—and add a grainy black-and-white photograph that had lain in an attic for decades. From these small clues, Pulitzer Prize-winning photographer Horst Faas and veteran Associated Press (AP) correspondent Richard Pyle put together their own ad hoc missing in action (MIA) search for four wartime friends and colleagues. *Lost Over Laos: A True Story of Tragedy, Mystery, and Friendship* documents Faas and Pyle's odyssey.

The authors' return to Southeast Asia brought closure to the lives of four combat photographers: Larry Burrows of *Life Magazine* (the Robert Capa of his day); AP's Henri Huet; United Press International's Kent Potter; and *Newsweek's* Keisaburo Shimamoto. In 1971, this foursome rode a Huey into oblivion.

In addition to the main story, a number of subcurrents flow through the book. Pyle and Faas examine and try to put into context the war's 1969 to 1971 extension into Laos and Cambodia. This major historical contribution provides a rare view into the lives and motivation of those who reported and photographed the war. The 20 pages of photographs Faas has assembled should intrigue readers. Faas himself was seriously wounded while following Capa's maxim: "If your pictures aren't good enough, you're not close enough."

Unfortunately the book's organization jumps around in time and sub-themes. Understandably perhaps, where emotion plays a large role, the passages are sometimes over-written. Less understandable is that

the writing occasionally sinks to the level of cliché.

As a highly personalized story of enduring friendship and, moreover, as a look at pre-digital war reporting using “typewriters” and film cameras, *Lost Over Laos* deserves its place on the bookshelf, but do not expect it to compare with such classics as Bernard B. Fall’s *Street Without Joy* (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1994).

Pyle and Faas’s search came to an end 27 years after the crash, when they and an MIA excavation team examined a possible site. The clues they found were enigmatic: a locket probably carried by Huet, some mildewed film without images, assorted Nikon lenses, and a misshapen, scorched Leica camera. Clearly, though, these artifacts were enough to convince the authors—and the photographer’s families—that on a remote Laotian hillside near the deserted Ho Chi Minh Trail their search was over.

**George Ridge, J.D.,
University of Arizona, Tucson**

ALL THE FACTORS OF VICTORY: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower, Thomas Wildenberg, Brassey’s Inc., Washington, DC, 2003, 326 pages, \$27.50.

Before dawn on 26 January 1929, during an exercise called Fleet Problem Nine, the USS *Saratoga* launched a 70-plane strike force toward the Panama Canal. Shortly after the strike began, the *Saratoga* encountered four “enemy” battleships. Rather than come about and outrun the slower battleships, the *Saratoga* ignored the battleships and continued toward the planned rendezvous site for the returning strike force.

Rear Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, who commanded the carrier group, had no alternative. That era’s poor communications and a paucity of tools for airborne navigation prevented the *Saratoga* from fleeing the enemy battleships if she were to recover her aircraft.

Unaware of the *Saratoga*’s dilemma, the strike force “attacked and destroyed” key locks on the Canal

and returned safely to the carrier. Despite the limitations of the era’s technology, the exercise ended as an equivocal success.

In *All the Factors of Victory*, author Thomas Wildenberg illuminates the career and character of Reeves during the years from the Spanish-American War to the end of World War II. Reeves invented the concept of the carrier battle group, which continues to afford the United States virtual sovereignty over the seas and assures responsive carrier-based airpower anywhere. Reeves was an unlikely radical. Fastidious in his appearance, almost hidebound in his devotion to the Navy, and conservative in most things he did, Reeves saw the potential of aviation and fought hard to assure the carrier’s future in an era when battleship admirals held sway.

Reeves’ story is compelling. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1894 and joined the fleet as it was transitioning from sail and steam ironclad ships to the big-gun battlewagons. Commissioned as an engineer when the Navy sharply divided engineers from deck officers, Reeves served aboard the USS *Oregon* as it led the chase to destroy the Spanish squadron sortieing from Santiago de Cuba. Reeves proved particularly talented at getting the most out of coal-fired power plants in turn-of-the-century warships.

Reeves was a brilliant engineer, and he became a brilliant line officer. Later, after transitioning to the line, he became an expert in the arcane problems of naval gunnery. In 1925, perceiving the potential of aviation, Reeves trained as a naval aviation observer and became the first aviation officer promoted to flag rank. Ultimately Reeves, who was a thoughtful, superb analyst and a proponent of aviation, commanded the fleet and supported the development of carrier aviation.

In publishing the first biography of this remarkable officer, Wildenberg does the Navy and military history a valuable service. Reeves left few papers behind, so Wildenberg uses a variety of sources, ranging from newspapers, official documents and accounts of Reeves in secondary

sources, to piece together a compelling, lucid account.

Wildenberg’s contribution to understanding the Navy and the matter of transformation generally is valuable. Change that appears revolutionary in retrospect seems evolutionary. Reeves’ conceptual thinking not only outpaced the technology of the day, but to some extent it also drove technical innovation. His story reveals as much about the means of change as it does the effects.

Reeves’ view of the world and his obligations as an officer are best illustrated by an observation he made to his chief of staff the night before the “strike” on the Panama Canal. His chief opined that there were plenty of “brass hats” who wanted to see Reeves and the air strike fail. Reeves replied, “I know, but a commander who stops to appraise the effect of a military decision upon his personal fortunes has no right to be entrusted with a command.”

**COL Gregory Fontenot, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

THE WEARY BOYS: Colonel J. Warren Keifer & the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Thomas E. Pope, The Kent State University Press, Ohio, 2002, 183 pages, \$16.00.

In *The Weary Boys: Colonel J. Warren Keifer & the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, author Thomas E. Pope blends facts and anecdotes into a readable account of the maligned 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, nicknamed “Milroy’s Weary Boys. According to Pope, the nickname was undeserved, prompting him to correct previous inaccurate portrayals of the regiment and brigade.

During operations leading up to Gettysburg, standby elements of Union General Robert Milroy’s division at Winchester, Virginia, were directly in the path of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and did not fare well. Milroy was court martialed.

Although this book chronicles the exploits of what might be perceived as minor players in the Civil War, I recommend it to die-hard Civil War buffs.

**CDR M.A. McAleenan, USNR,
N&MCRC, Denver, Colorado**

PEARL HARBOR SURVIVORS: An Oral History of 24 Servicemen, Harry Spiller, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, NC, 2002, 216 pages, \$30.00.

Only those who were there can appreciate the horror of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Only those who survived can even attempt to explain it. Sadly, the numbers of those who survived Pearl Harbor are diminishing rapidly. Many books are available that capture the remembrances of World War II veterans. Most notable are Tom Brokaw's books, *The Greatest Generation* (Random House, Westminster, MD, 1998) and *The Greatest Generation Speaks* (Random House, Westminster, MD, 1999).

Harry Spiller adds to the legacy with oral accounts of 24 servicemen who were at Pearl Harbor on that fateful December morning. Even though he offers no new insight into the battle or the indomitable human spirit, there is something compelling in his accounts from men who continue to feel anger, pain, and loss more than 60 years after the attack. For those who think only in terms of history and tactics, strategy and battles, this book reaffirms the triumph of the human spirit.

LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC,
Retired, Fallbrook, CA

AMERICAN JIHAD: The Terrorists Living Among Us, Steven Emerson, The Free Press, NY, 2002, 261 pages, \$26.00.

In *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us*, which is based on the 1994 Public Broadcasting System documentary "Jihad in America," Steven Emerson reveals the fact that Islamic militants are living and thriving in the democracy they profess to abhor. Because many Middle East regimes have tough internal security services that snuff out political dissent and give no quarter, many radical organizations find it difficult to operate. They need freedom from scrutiny to raise funds, recruit, publish, and meet. Many organizations have bases in the United States and several European nations.

Emerson reveals that organizations such as Algeria's Armed Islamic Group, Egypt's Gammaa al-Islamiyah, Lebanon's Hizbollah, and the Pales-

tinian Hamas have held major conventions in Kansas City, Oklahoma City, and Bridgeview, Illinois. Such conventions offered radical groups opportunities to strategize on a global scale.

Many Muslim advocacy groups are actually organizations for money laundering, recruiting, and pamphleteering. The organizations also target moderate or nonradical Muslims, both inside and outside the United States, for harassment or worse.

According to Emerson, the Islamic Committee for Palestine associated itself with the University of South Florida and posed as a mainstream religious group. It enjoyed a tax-exempt status, bolstered the university's multicultural program, and escaped the scrutiny of law enforcement. In actuality, it was a haven for Palestinians supporting militant activities in the name of liberating Palestine. This kind of militant activity casts a shadow on legitimate Muslim student associations that offer members a chance to practice their faith in peace.

At an Islamic militant conference in Oklahoma City in 1988, Abdullah Shiekh Azzam, one of the first clerics to openly advocate the teachings of radicals like Muhammad Faraj, declared that "Jihad means fighting, only fighting with the sword!" One cannot understand al-Qaeda without understanding Azzam's teachings. Azzam, the "grandfather" of al-Qaeda, influenced Osama bin-Laden to take up the jihadist struggle.

During the 1980s Azzam founded the al-Kifaah network, also called the Maktab al-Khadamat (the services office), which brought order and organization to thousands of Arabs who had volunteered to go to war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Azzam's organization provided safe houses, training, orientation, and transportation from the Middle East to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan. After his assassination, Azzam's organization grew into al-Qaeda, with Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri as its leaders.

Emerson's book is important because it helps differentiate between the militant from the moderate Muslim and articulates the threat militant

Islamic groups pose to Americans as well as to moderate and liberal Muslims. Unfortunately, Emerson tends to be lumped with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, whose book *The Rage and the Pride* (New York: Rezzoli International Publications, Inc., October 2002) focuses on proving the superiority of Western civilization and feeds the Islamic militant's notion of a worldwide conspiracy against Islam.

Books such as Fallaci's do not solve the problem of terrorism or help identify genuine threats against the United States. Still, counterterrorism specialists and Middle East foreign area officers should read this book.

LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland

THE CAVALRY BATTLE THAT SAVED THE UNION: Custer vs. Stuart at Gettysburg, Paul D. Walker, Pelican Publishing Company, Gretna, LA, 2002, 155 pages, \$18.95.

Most historians consider Confederate General George Pickett's infantry charge at Gettysburg to be the final, desperate act of the bloodiest battle of the Civil War. In *The Cavalry Battle that Saved the Union: Custer vs. Stuart at Gettysburg*, Paul D. Walker reveals the apparent genius behind the plan: Confederate General Robert E. Lee's grand scheme was to attack with infantry from the front while Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry swept into the rear of the Union formations.

In an engagement rarely mentioned in histories of the battle, Union Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer—outnumbered and at a decided disadvantage—counterattacked with 5,000 Union cavalrymen. As Confederate forces massed opposite Cemetery Ridge for the decisive assault, four brigades of rebel cavalry and artillery attacked from the rear, with the outcome of the Civil War at stake.

Walker, a 30-year veteran of armored cavalry formations, was inspired to write *The Cavalry Battle that Saved the Union* while a student at the Army War College. There he learned that despite involving nearly 13,000 cavalrymen from both sides, the battle rarely receives mention in

any official histories. Only David F. Riggs' relatively short account of the battle *East of Gettysburg: Custer vs. Stuart* (Old Army Press, Fort Collins, CO, 1970 [revised 1985]), chronicles the engagement.

If the cavalry engagement between Stuart and Custer was so significant, why does it receive such little attention? The author does not answer the question. Quite possibly, most historians and scholars have concluded that the cavalry engagement was minor in comparison with Pickett's charge and has been treated accordingly. But so little documented evidence exists on Custer's and Stuart's clash in the wooded hills south of Crest Ridge that Walker's account is a valuable addition to Gettysburg's history.

The book offers a new perspective to readers and will doubtless intrigue Civil War scholars. Followers of Civil War cavalry and the exploits of a young Custer will likely find that this volume suits their taste for mounted action. Walker's writing style is crisp and gritty, and each page is alive with the smell of old leather. The book is an excellent niche book for those already familiar with the events of Gettysburg and a worthwhile addition to any library dedicated to documenting the battle.

MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,
Fort Campbell, Kentucky

DISOBEDIENCE AND CONSPIRACY IN THE GERMAN ARMY, 1918-1945, Robert B. Kane, McFarland & Co., Jefferson, NC, 2002, 259 pages, \$45.00.

In *Disobedience and Conspiracy in the German Army, 1918-1945*, Robert B. Kane investigates why some German military leaders obeyed and some defied German Chancellor Adolf Hitler during World War II. Kane methodically and thoroughly examines the relationship between Prussian and German militaries and political activities in the centuries before the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich.

By 1944 there were three types of military leaders in the Third Reich: conspirators, best exemplified by Colonel Klaus von Staufenberg, leader of the 20 July 1944 assassina-

tion plot; nonconspirators; and followers, such as Hitler sycophants Colonel General Alfred Jodl and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. In Kane's view, most of the officers were nonconspirators. They were not reconciled totally with the National Socialist ideology, but they were disinclined to actively defy Hitler. In many instances, they were aware of anti-Nazi activities and did nothing.

Kane seeks to answer the dual questions of what made conspirators willing to risk or lose their lives to resist Hitler and why nonconspirators were unable or unwilling to do so. His detailed analysis concludes that conspirators were driven primarily by a "liberal, humanistic education, a familial environment that encouraged . . . intellectual development, and a spiritual Christianity" that made moral considerations central to their lives. As for nonconspirators, their military oath of loyalty, first given in 1934, was the primary reason for their unwillingness to act. Kane focuses specifically on the importance of the oath as being representative of a mentality; it was a symbol of the relationship between the nation, its leader, and the army that overshadowed all others.

Kane's informative, interesting, and useful study is a valuable addition to professional knowledge. He tackles the difficult issues of morality and duty and shows how officers in Hitler's Third Reich dealt with them.

MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany

THIRTY SECONDS OVER TOKYO, Ted W. Lawson, Robert Considine, ed., Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 2002, 223 pages, \$24.95.

In recognition of the 60th anniversary of Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle's raid on Japan, Brassey's has reprinted Ted W. Lawson's classic *Thirty Seconds over Tokyo*. Most likely, World War II enthusiasts have already read Lawson's superb account of his role in the raid and his dramatic escape out of China. The review from the *New York Herald Tribune* of the original edition sums up the book perfectly: "It is a manly young American's simple, straightfor-

ward record of events and impressions gathered on one of the most desperate and colorful adventures of modern times."

I would, however, like to highlight the things Brassey's has added to the reprint. There are twice as many photographs as in the original 1943 edition, which gives the book a more personal touch. Peter Meresky, a well-known military aviation author, has written an excellent foreword that focuses on the raid's importance and the changes it brought to the psyches of the men on both sides. Meresky also draws the obvious parallels between Pearl Harbor and the Doolittle raid and the events of 11 September 2001 and operations in Afghanistan.

Ellen Lawson adds an introduction to her husband's book, and although her words might have had a better effect at the end of the book (as a concluding chapter), her viewpoint adds significantly to the story. Since she was so much a part of her husband's determination and will to escape from China, it is appropriate that we read about her feelings on the events. Such additions make an outstanding book even better and give readers a better understanding of the raid and of Lawson himself.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FREDERICKSBURG! FREDERICKSBURG! George C. Rable, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2002, 671 pages, \$45.00.

Sandwiched between the more famous battles of Sharpsburg and Chancellorsville, the Union debacle at Fredericksburg receives relatively less attention. George C. Rable rectifies this shortfall.

Rable's approach is unusual in some ways, as he takes pains to establish the political context of the battle. He also devotes a great deal of attention to the experiences of the common soldier leading up to the battle. This approach has drawbacks, however, as Rable relates repetitive tales (from both sides) of bad food, cold weather, and exhausting marches during the weeks before the battle. After dealing so extensively with the political context and the experiences

of common soldiers, Rable devotes only 80 pages to the actual fighting of 13 December 1862.

When Rable does focus on the actual combat at Fredericksburg, the results are excellent. His narrative is detailed, yet comprehensive. The courageous, yet hopeless, Federal assaults against Marye's Heights is inspiring. Rabel's narrative is similar to the opening of the film *Saving Private Ryan* (DreamWorks, Glendale, CA, 1998) with soldiers wearing blue instead of green. The soldiers of Fredericksburg deserve to have their story told; Rable tells it well.

**LTC D. Jonathan White, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

WITH SHERIDAN IN THE FINAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST LEE, by Lt. Col. Frederick C. Newhall, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Eric J. Wittenberg, ed., Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2002, 212 pages, \$39.95.

For much of the Civil War, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Newhall served as provost marshal and staff officer for Union cavalry commander Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan. Written in 1866, Newhall's memoir records events fresh in his mind. As erudite as he is at times, Newhall's enthusiasm for Sheridan—complete with quaint limericks—borders on fawning. However, his dotting does not blur the book's primary value—demonstrating Sheridan's excellence at the operational level of warfare as he directs the maneuver of divisions and corps to interdict Confederate troop movements and deny them the use of march routes and approaches.

Throughout the narrative, Newhall conscientiously records Sheridan's part in key battles, including Saylor's Creek, Dinwiddie Court House, Five Forks, and Appomattox. His inclusion of Sheridan's troop dispatches is a valuable part of this historical record. He details Sheridan's pursuit of retreating Confederate forces, but also sorts out divergent accounts of the same battle, where various Union generals take credit for victory.

Editor Eric J. Wittenberg, a historian and lawyer, is an expert on Sheridan and the author of *Glory Enough for All: Sheridan's Second Raid and the Battle for Trevilian*

Station (Brassey's, Inc., Washington, DC, 2002). He includes several enlightening appendixes to Newhall's original work. The first one is a helpful order of battle for Union and Confederate forces in the Appomattox Campaign. A second appendix includes Union Major General Gouverneur K. Warren's defense of his conduct at the Battle of Five Forks on 1 April 1865. (Sheridan had relieved Warren as V Corps commander for slackness in responding to attack orders.) A third appendix is Newhall's answer to Warren. Wittenberg includes brief and interesting biographies of Union and Confederate soldiers in his footnotes, explaining obscure terms and summarizing the combat actions Newhall cites.

Another factor that makes this reprint interesting is that Newhall wrote his memoir just a year after the war's end. His weaving Sheridan into florid literary analogies makes one wonder if Newhall was writing a preemptive broadside against Sheridan's potential detractors.

Wittenberg is an expert historiographer, making this book an outstanding addition to studies of generalship in the Civil War's final campaigns. By bringing Newhall's memoir back into print, Wittenberg has done readers of this formative time in American history a genuine service.

**MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF,
Ramstein Airbase, Germany**

THE DEMON IN THE FREEZER: A True Story, Richard Preston, Random House Audio, NY, 2002, 5 CDs (6 hours) abridged, \$29.95.

The Demon in the Freezer is another medical thriller from Richard Preston, the author of the 1994 bestseller *The Hot Zone: A Terrifying True Story* (Anchor Press Ltd., Nelson, New Zealand, 1995). Preston shifts fire from Ebola to smallpox and from natural epidemics to manmade calamity.

Preston begins his tale with a detailed history of smallpox and its subsequent eradication via strategic vaccination. The variola virus, which causes smallpox, was officially confined to only two storage depots, one in Russia and the other at the Cen-

ters for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. These were to be the only live virus samples in the world and they were to be kept to aid in developing a better vaccine and for scientific study. Unfortunately the virus was not confined to these repositories and research was not restricted to scientific purposes. Inspections in 1991 revealed that the Russians had bred the virus, "weaponized" it, and had even developed missile delivery systems for its use as a biological nuclear weapon. The dissolution of the Soviet Union further complicates the true status of the presumably extinct virus. Who has the bug now, and who is still working on it as a weapon? Preston is convincing in putting forth the case that the genie is out of the bottle and is probably residing in weapons in Russia or China.

Preston also delves into the post-11 September 2001 anthrax attacks, using the attacks to illustrate how easily a devastating assault with smallpox could occur here. The message is ominous and sobering. Biological weapons are all too easy to acquire, develop, and employ. Sponsor states and amorphous apocalyptic terrorists like al-Qaeda could come together in a deadly combination to wreak terrible damage.

Preston writes his true tales in the same manner that Tom Clancy writes his fictional tales. Preston humanizes his scientific expertise by focusing on individual scientists, patients, physicians, and government workers. He gives an entirely dramatic account of these compelling topics, writing in a clear, forceful, engaging manner.

**LTC John R. Sutherland, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

NOT CONDEMNED TO REPETITION: The United States and Nicaragua, Robert A. Pastor, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, (1998) 2001, 352 pages, \$22.00.

Robert A. Pastor, a well-known authority on Latin America, served on President Jimmy Carter's National Security Council and later monitored elections in Nicaragua. In *Not Condemned to Repetition, The United States and Nicaragua*, he emphasizes the importance of engagement

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when dealing with the Sandinistas. The book is a revised edition of Pastor's earlier work *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987), which concludes that U.S. policy toward Nicaragua was a tragic replay of the failed U.S. policy toward Cuba. His second book includes an explanation of how it happened.

Pastor is an elegant writer and his occasional subtle use of the first person gives this history lesson a novel-like quality. Pastor is not a sideline critic, which makes his perspective great reading. His loyalty and respect for Carter are obvious, and he writes disapprovingly about President Ronald Reagan's Nicaragua strategy. But he allows himself no political nagging or cheap shots. He keeps his commentary professional, as well he should: history has proven him right.

**CW2 Steven M. Bradley, USA,
Fort Lewis, Washington**

PAKISTAN: Eye of the Storm, Owen Bennett Jones, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002, 328 pages, \$29.95.

International concerns about war, terrorism, Islamic extremism, nuclear proliferation, and regional instability swirl about Pakistan. Although Pakistan has always sought to be a friend of America, America's response toward Pakistan has varied from enthusiasm to indifference, depending on America's immediate needs. The relationship is again warming as the United States engages in the Global War on Terrorism. How long this renewed friendship will hold is conjecture. Pakistan is a crucial state in a crucial region, and things are not going well there.

Owen Bennett Jones, a noted British journalist and broadcasting company correspondent, has spent a good deal of time in Pakistan. His excellent book emphasizes the current military government; the deep ethnic and linguistic divides; the military; the atomic bomb; and religious extremism and relationships with India, China, and Afghanistan. Jones lays out these key issues and shows why they are important for the region and the world.

Pakistan's leaders range from democratically elected to military dictator, from enlightened to venal, yet their effect on society has been slight because Pakistan's institutions are weak. Pakistan lives in permanent economic and social crisis. Corruption is rampant, tax avoidance common, justice problematic, decent education scarce, and social welfare programs nonexistent.

Pakistan is a poor country with a 45 percent adult literacy rate. The country has a large population of young people who have little education or prospects. The best and brightest students go abroad for university education—and do not return. Pakistan's upperclass is split between the West and those in Pakistan who run the family businesses.

Pakistan's first allegiance is to its ethnic groups and clans. The military holds the country together and often takes over the government when politicians seem unable to govern efficiently. Military government, while not particularly efficient, has proven more effective and capable of delivering change. In many respects, the military *is* the state.

The current leader, General Perez Musharraf, is a modern, intelligent leader who seized power and rules through the military yet hopes to restore democratic rule. He opposes Islamic fundamentalism and the establishment of a theocracy, yet his initiatives fail to make headway against rising radical Islam. His options are limited and Pakistan's problems are many, so it is difficult to be optimistic about the future of Pakistan or the region.

This is one of two books that will help the reader understand Pakistan. The other is Brian Cloughley's *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000).

Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE PUEBLO INCIDENT: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy, Mitchell B. Lerner, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2002, 320 pages, \$34.95.

North Korea is a threat to the free world today, just as it was a threat in January 1968 when it seized the USS

Pueblo and kept its crew in captivity for 335 days. President Lyndon B. Johnson treated this act of piracy as a sideshow to the larger war in Vietnam and as an even smaller event in the Cold War. What effect the *Pueblo's* presence now has on North Korea's decisionmaking is unknown, but the United States might still be paying for an incident that occurred over 30 years ago.

Although Mitchell B. Lerner might be criticized as being overly critical of the U.S. Navy's security onboard the *Pueblo* and for having hindsight vision, he has done a service for anyone interested in the details of the attack on the *Pueblo* by telling the tale of the officers and men of the ship and providing insight into national-level decisionmaking after the seizure. Lerner fills longstanding gaps in the story and takes a revisionist interpretation of the incident by assessing their domestic political situation as paramount, rather than some larger pan-communist conspiracy. His insight might be useful in the current crisis as well.

Lerner's work, which is the best study about the seizure, retention, and the eventual release of the *Pueblo's* crew, should be mandatory reading for anyone concerned about the current situation in Northeast Asia.

**Peter J. Schiefferle, Ph.D.,
Lansing, Kansas**

THE DEAD VOLCANO: The Background and Effects of Nuclear War Complacency, Stephen J. Cimbala, Praeger Publishing, Westport, CT, 2002, 271 pages, \$67.95.

Stephen J. Cimbala's book *The Dead Volcano: The Background and Effects of Nuclear War Complacency* discusses nuclear relations between the United States and the Russian Federation in the wake of the Cold War. The title is significant; it is based on a parable the author provides: "Just because people live on the side of a volcano and the volcano has not erupted for some time does not mean that the volcano will never erupt." Just because nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 does not mean that they could not be used again.

Most of the book deals with the various treaties (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) between the United States and the former Soviet Union. As the successor state to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation controls the majority of the nuclear weapons that belonged to the Soviet Union. Agreements to reduce the numbers of these weapons have been ongoing for some time.

Although Cimbala lays out *Dead Volcano* thematically, he has arranged it chronologically, detailing exhaustive calculations relating to the hypothetical use of nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. The book's weakness is that the topic of nuclear relations changes quickly, and it is arguable today that there is more of a threat from smaller states than from Russia.

The book's main strength lies in hypothetical facts and figures, and the chapter about the spread of nuclear weapons to countries outside the current nuclear family is quite relevant, since it is based on current world events. The chapter discusses the possibility of nonnuclear countries producing nuclear weapons with special attention given to North Korea and Iraq. Cimbala underscores the fact that Pakistan and India, which have nuclear weapons now, are striving to produce more powerful weapons that have longer ranges.

Dead Volcano adds value to the defense community in its analysis of nuclear relations; something everyone in the defense community should be at least familiar with and concerned about. The book might not appeal to a general audience because of its technical tone, but it is relevant, and anyone with an interest in peace studies, foreign policy, or military affairs should read it.

CPL David J. Schepp,
Fort Benning, Georgia

SERVING TWO MASTERS: The Development of American Military Chaplaincy, 1860-1920, Richard M. Budd, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2002, 191 pages, \$45.00.

Serving Two Masters: The Development of American Military Chap-

laincy, 1860-1920, is a history of U.S. military chaplaincy in the Army and Navy. Richard M. Budd analyzes six periods in the chaplaincy's development: colonial, Civil War, post-Civil war, Spanish American, World War I, and post-World War I. He discusses how the chaplaincy evolved and how the military relates to chaplains. He also examines the different denominations and how they relate within the Chaplain Corps and the Armed Forces.

The book gives a keen perspective on Army chaplaincy. Discussions concerning rank, uniforms, connectivity with enlisted soldiers, and relationships with commanders sound familiar although the dialog might have occurred 100 years ago.

I recommend this book to all chaplains and their assistants, especially those new to the Chaplain Corps. It should be on the reading list for the Chaplain Officer Basic Course and the chaplain's assistant Advance Individual Training.

CH (LTC) Thomas C. Condry,
USA, Conyers, Georgia

HOME TO WAR: A History of the Vietnam Veterans' Movement, Gerald Nicosia, Crown Publishers, NY, 2001, 689 pages, \$35.00.

Gerald Nicosia, a former draft resister who felt he had "a moral duty not to fight in Vietnam," tells how a handful of disillusioned veterans formed the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). The book addresses an area in the war's history that has received little attention. Over a 10-year period, Nicosia interviewed 600 men who had served in the Vietnam war and who became active in the antiwar movement or worked as veterans' advocates.

Although Nicosia is not a historian, one would expect that he would handle the topic in a fair, objective manner; however, he did not. The perception that he would be unbiased was quickly dispelled when he described in the prologue the "dreaded lifelong stigma of the Vietnam veteran." Such emotional generalizations pervade the book, revealing that Nicosia is more advocate than anything else. He clearly empathizes with VVAW leaders such as Jan Barry, Larry Rottman, Scott

Camill, Al Hubbard, and Ron Kovic and is almost fawning in his description of what he calls their "thirty years of activism, readjustment, and healing," paying scant attention to other less confrontational Vietnam veterans groups.

Nicosia also addresses the battles that returning veterans had with the Veterans Administration (VA). Many abuses occurred in the treatment of Vietnam veterans at the hands of the VA and other government agencies over the issues of Agent Orange and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, Nicosia throws away any chance to provide an objective critique of these abuses by continually citing the stereotypical statistics about Vietnam veterans and their rates of drug abuse, homelessness, suicide, unemployment, and crime. In most cases, these statistics have been proven grossly inaccurate. Lapsing into an emotionalism that pervades this large book, Nicosia passionately attacks the VA when he could have been more effective by simply stating what happened. Unfortunately, his message is lost in all the passion.

Veterans who came back from Vietnam and protested against America's continued involvement in the war certainly had the hard-won right to organize and protest if they so chose. Their story deserves to be told in a fair and objective manner. Nicosia has failed in his effort to do so. For this reason, I do not recommend the book.

James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TO REACH THE HIGH FRONTIER: A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles, Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. Jenkins, eds., University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2002, 519 pages, \$49.95.

What is the space shuttle's future? How will NASA recover from the February 2003 space shuttle disaster? Are the answers to these questions hidden in the past?

To Reach the High Frontier: A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles describes the history and the tragedies and triumphs of NASA and the military. The book details how science fiction has turned into reality. The

heroes are the scientists, inventors, designers, project managers, and visionaries who saw the potential of rockets. The biggest hero is President John F. Kennedy, whose national goal of sending a man to the moon and back energized the development of rockets and encouraged civilian and military cooperation.

This well-footnoted book details the history of U.S. rockets and propellants from World War II to modern space flights when there were amazing advances in fuels, engines, targeting, materials, and rocket bodies; however, the high cost of these developments forced the space program to develop a reusable platform—the space shuttle.

The space shuttle is America's primary vehicle into space for the near future. The best way to help NASA recover from the latest disaster is to have a goal that can again inspire and captivate the Nation into looking even further into space.

**MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF,
Yokota Airbase, Japan.**

COMBAT JUMP: The Young Men Who Led the Assault into Fortress Europe, July 1943, Ed Ruggero, Harper-Collins Publishers, New York, 2003, 400 pages, \$24.95.

Ed Ruggero's *Combat Jump: The Young Men Who Led the Assault into Fortress Europe, July 1943*, is the story of the airborne assault on Sicily told through stories from soldiers and leaders of the 505th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). Although the book is interesting, readers will not find many enlightening insights or revelations. Much of the information about the creation of the first airborne units, their training, personnel lost to create additional units, the replacement system, and shipment overseas will be familiar to those who have read unit histories or other personal narratives concerning World War II.

Ruggero provides a good understanding of small-unit actions, including the first night parachute assault during World War II and combat leader challenges during the battle for Sicily. Participants' actions during the drop offer examples of the courage and ingenuity of the officers and men of the 505th. But

Ruggero also includes incidents of poor performance by some unit leaders. For example, Colonel James Gavin, commander of the 505th RCT, relieved one of his battalion commanders just days before the drop. The executive officer (XO) who assumed command and the captain who became the battalion XO faced many challenges. How they confronted them is of interest and offers the reader insight into the leadership challenges with which new commanders must deal during imminent combat.

Much of the story of the airborne assault on Sicily is detailed in other books; Ruggero tells the paratroopers' story. His storytelling style makes the book entertaining, and I recommend it for readers who enjoy reading personal accounts of battle.

**LTC Robert J. Rielly, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT: Preserving Corporate Knowledge and Productivity When Employees Leave, Hamilton Beazley, Jeremiah Boenisch, and David Harden, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2002, 269 pages, \$29.95.

Written by a former business professor at George Washington University (GWU) and two Air Force captains who earned their masters' degrees at GWU, *Continuity Management: Preserving Corporate Knowledge and Productivity When Employees Leave* tackles a pressing issue for military units: personnel turnover. Major Donald Vandergriff previously called attention to the problem of personnel turnover in *The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs* (Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2002), and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker argued for a move to "unit manning" in a speech at the Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting in October 2003.

Hamilton Beazley and Captains Jeremiah Boenisch and David Harden propose a solution to this problem. In some ways, unit standing operating procedures and continuity files accomplish some of the objectives that the authors develop in *Continuity Management*, but the authors take the subject of personnel turn-

over much further. Citing evidence about the productivity and resources lost through personnel turnover, they make a strong case for the dangers and costs of lost knowledge. For Army officers and noncommissioned officers who have seen the difficulties that turnover creates in units across the Army, this is hardly a difficult case to make.

As the authors proceed with their proposal, it becomes clear that continuity management will take considerable time and effort for organization's choosing to adopt the strategy. The authors argue that the practice of continuity management is more than just another management fad, but I am not entirely convinced.

Although the book is fairly easy to read, it might not hold the attention of Army readers who cannot implement these serious reforms. Readers with interests in preserving unit knowledge might find the book useful and integrate the practices into their work. For the most part, however, continuity management seems too ambitious for most leaders or staff officers to adopt.

In the future, as information operations become more critical for Army units and private corporations, these techniques might be part of larger information management or knowledge management responsibilities. However, it is unlikely that continuity management will dominate unit policies to the extent the authors advocate.

**CPT Matthew J. Morgan, USA,
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii**

THE NORTH KOREAN REVOLUTION: 1945-1950 (Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University), Charles K. Armstrong, Cornell University Press, NY, 2004, 265 pages, \$39.95.

In *The North Korean Revolution: 1945-1950*, Associate Professor of History and Director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University Charles K. Armstrong examines North Korea's formative period between World War II and the Korean war, when Kim Il Sung and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rose to power.

Armstrong's book is extensively researched and replete with footnotes

to Korean, U.S. military, and Soviet source documentation. Armstrong reviewed over 1.6 million pages of documents that U.S. forces captured during the Korean war. The book is not easy to read, but it provides a wealth of factual information and historical background that increases the persistent reader's understanding of North Korea's communist history and present idiosyncrasies.

Armstrong attempts to dispel the traditional Western view that communist North Korea is the creation and puppet regime of the Soviets. He delineates an important, yet limited, Soviet role in the early years of North Korea's communist government. In Armstrong's view, the Soviet and North Korean relationship is better defined as the "Koreanization" of Soviet communism, rather than the "Sovietization" of North Korea. While Armstrong acknowledges Soviet and Chinese influences in the formation and early development of communist North Korea, he argues that there was an independent and uniquely Korean adaptation of Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese influences that resulted in the complete transformation of North Korean society between 1945 and 1950.

Armstrong devotes substantial attention to other important facets of North Korea's history, including the cult of Kim Il Sung; the role of film, literature, and education in shaping the North Korean people to a communist model; the Korean participation in Chinese guerrilla activities in Manchuria against Japanese occupation forces; and the communists' effective use of land reform and other programs to garner party support from the lower societal classes.

The book is probably more appealing as a reference or a serious reading assignment for avid political science or Korean history enthusiasts than it is to military historians or soldiers. However, while the average reader might not want to read the entire book, he will find that Armstrong has divided the book into logical chapters that make specific aspects of North Korean history readily accessible.

**CPT Jeffrey J. Kuebler, USA,
Lexington, Kentucky**

ONE WORLD: The Ethics of Globalization, Peter Singer, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002, 208 pages, \$21.95.

Peter Singer's *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* deals with global warming, world trade, international law, and the concept of community. The book concludes with a call for a better world. If all this sounds familiar, it should. Globalization has been extensively examined from the political perspective. However, Singer takes an ethical rather than the customary political approach in his writing.

To Singer, ethics is a modified utilitarianism, something he calls "consequentialism," which requires that benefits must outweigh cost; even legal actions can be unethical if they violate this rule. Under consequentialism, the nation-state falls short because it is unjust in matters of ecology, economics, justice, humanitarian aid, and other human concerns. Current world organizations are insufficient. Even the UN is invalid because it is not based on any expression of popular will.

Throughout the book, Singer uses the United States as the epitome of what needs to change, and sees such actions as ethically unacceptable in a world becoming increasingly international. For example, he stresses that the United States—

- Refuses to ratify the Kyoto Treaty on global warming and is by far the worst emitter of greenhouse gases.

- Contributes little foreign aid or charitable giving and what it does give is pathetically inadequate.

- Participates only in world bodies it dominates.

- Operates under the obsolete nationalistic cliché that "might makes right."

The book might seem peripheral to the concerns of the military because the military is one of the last bastions of nationalism in an increasingly international world. However, the military of the future has to support those interventions that the international community finds valid. Those who put their lives on the line would be wise to have a legitimate, livable rationale for what they do. They will be committing themselves to war for

people far away—true strangers, culturally and religiously. The simplistic fighting for "the good old U.S.A." is sliding into the dustbin of history, and those who live in the 21st century should be aware of this.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Yukon, Oklahoma**

TO DESTROY A CITY: Strategic Bombing and its Human Consequences in World War II, Herman Knell, Da Capo Press, NY, 2002, 352 pages, \$32.50.

Herman Knell, a retired Canadian citizen, was a teenage German boy during World War II. The Allies "area bombed" his hometown of Wurzburg, Germany, during the last weeks of World War II, killing 5,000 civilians and leaving 90,000 homeless.

Knell's personal experiences of losing his family home in one area and his family's business in another gave him a lifelong desire to find out why his particular city was bombed, even though it had no apparent military value and its destruction served only to impede the Allies' post-war recovery efforts. He also wanted to know whether the concept of city bombing has any moral or legal support. The former question is a footnote to history, but multiplied a hundred times or more, it raises serious questions for historians when they evaluate the decisions of war. The latter question has implications to all who conduct war now and in the future.

Knell gives a tight, simplified version of the development of air war strategy by the Allies, from World War I through World War II. He describes how the British, victims of German area bombing in World War I, had to disproportionately transfer resources from their military venture to protect citizens and how, at first, German terrorism seemed to determine even high-level British war policy.

Britain advocated intensive area bombing to destroy enemy morale, while America advocated daytime precision bombing against key industrial targets. Knell's research shows a lesser known point: elements of the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) also advocated area bomb-

ing (in fact, area bombing was the primary means to bring Japan to its knees, aided in large part by nuclear weapons). The USAAF escalated its area bombing in Europe, although Knell suggests that such terror bombing was not politically acceptable.

Knell's book is a combination of personal reporting of the effects on citizens exposed to area bombing and personal commentary on the debate over the legality and efficacy of such warfare. His questions of morality, legality, efficacy, and alternative options demand more extensive study.

LTC Dana K. Drenkowski, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HONOR UNTARNISHED: A West Point Graduate's Memoir of World War II, General Donald V. Bennett (Ret.) and William R. Forstchen, Forge Books, New York, 2003, 320 pages, \$25.95.

What sets *Honor Untarnished: A West Point Graduate's Memoir in World War II* apart from most World War II memoirs is its candor; it is a

straightforward narrative of battle command at the tactical level. This engrossing story will appeal to history buffs and academicians alike because the author, General Donald V. Bennett, U.S. Army, Retired, experienced the battlefields of World War II, survived to tell about them, then served at the highest ranks of the U.S. military.

Each year, hundreds of books are published about World War II. Most are written by historians trying to capture the essence of battle from manuscripts, notes, or diaries of foot soldiers who after 60 years or so attempt to capture their experiences as enlisted men. However, Bennett's experiences as a lieutenant colonel at the tactical level of command provide a unique perspective on the operational reasoning behind his units' actions in North Africa, Normandy, and the infamous Battle of the Bulge.

Bennett and co-author William R. Forstchen, an acclaimed military author, bring the truth to bear on some

intriguing topics. For instance, many have seen the Hollywood enactment of the chaos surrounding the beach landings in Normandy portrayed in the movie *Saving Private Ryan* (DreamWorks, Glendale, CA, 1998). Bennett's depiction maintains the chaotic nature of the landings that fateful day. However, he brings a sense of reality to the density of soldiers involved in the beach assault.

Another revealing insight is Bennett's version of the infamous "slapping incident" that caused so much turmoil for General George S. Patton in Sicily. Such first-hand accounts make this book better than the average World War II history.

Honor Untarnished, an enduring contribution to the successes of men who fought the Nation's greatest war, pays tribute to the members of the 58th and 62d Armored Artillery Battalions in which Bennett served so proudly in defense of freedom.

LTC Dominic J. Caracillo,
USA, Vincenza, Italy

MR Letters

Ethical Decisionmaking

BRIG N.B. Grant, *AVSM, Retired, Pune, India*—In "Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decisionmaking" (*Military Review* March-April 2003), Major Charles A. Pfaff poses the following problem: "A platoon is on a rescue mission. Two members of the platoon are trapped on a hill and under fire. Both soldiers are seriously wounded; within a few hours, they will be dead. Between the platoon and the two soldiers is a minefield, which the platoon must breach or go around if they are to get to the trapped soldiers in time. As the platoon leader ponders his options, he notices a civilian picking his way through the minefield. Obviously he knows where the mines are. The lieutenant detains the civilian, but the man refuses to lead the platoon through the minefield. The lieutenant offers several enticements to get the man to cooperate, but the man continues to refuse. There is no way he is going back through the minefield. The lieutenant must make a decision

that he had hoped to avoid. There are rules for situations like this, but if he follows them, good men will die. . . .

"The lieutenant in the scenario has a choice. He can torture or threaten to torture the civilian into cooperating, or he can decide to not torture or threaten to torture the civilian and effectively leave his men to die. Unfortunately for the lieutenant, the decision is not a simple one. If he chooses the first option, he violates the law of war. If he chooses the second option, he will have directly contributed to his men's deaths"[66].

My answer to the lieutenant's dilemma is simple; follow the Indian Military Academy's credo, attributed to Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode: "The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time." (See on-line at <www.image.org/>, accessed 19 November 2003.)

By threatening or torturing the civilian into cooperating, thereby saving the lives of his men, the lieutenant best serves the interest of his country and the men under his command, even if this means violating the law of war—and possibly paying the price with his career.

Deuce-Four Lacking

Ferdinand E. Banks, *Department of Economics, The University of Uppsala (Sweden)*—In September-October 2003, *Military Review* published "The 24th Infantry Regiment: The 'Deuce-Four' in Korea," by Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Biggs, [U.S. Army, Retired], who commanded a company in the 24th Infantry Regiment—an all black company—during the Korean war.

Biggs described equipment shortages in his company when it arrived in Korea. According to Biggs, the company lacked everything except personal weapons. These days it is possible to hear a great deal about

things like the lack of training in Japan and equipment shortages in Korea.

I left the 24th Infantry Regiment about 7 months before the Korean war started. During my 15 months with the regiment, I was a squad and section leader of machineguns and 75-millimeter recoilless rifles. I was also in the 81-millimeter mortar platoon. I do not remember any equipment shortages in our company or any other company in the regiment.

As for the training, after I was fired from my engineering job in Los Angeles, I reenlisted in 1953. I do not recall the training I received at that time as being any better than that I received when I was in Japan.

Since my days with the 24th, I

have held professorships in economics and finance in about 10 countries, and I expect to receive another visiting position soon. Much of my time is spent researching military sections of libraries, and I am amazed at the nonsense that is printed about the Korean and Vietnam wars. What you do not expect, however, is to find this kind of nonsense in the *Military Review*.

Let me solve the mystery of why things were the way they were in the early days of that war. The United States did not immediately send every combat aircraft they had to Korea. As for the reason why they did not—well, as a former member of the “deuce-four” who considers himself the best economics teacher in the world, I am not interested.

Rebuttal—“Deuce-Four”

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Biggs, *U.S. Army, Retired*—I will not reply in detail here [to Mr. Banks]. I do not want to start a “slug-fest.”

Kudos for “Deuce-Four”

Steve Dark, *Concord, California*—I am reading Stanley Weintraub’s *MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (Touchstone Books, New York, 2001). [While doing research about the Korean war on the Internet,] I stumbled across *Military Review*’s site, specifically Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Biggs’s excellent article in the September-October 2003 issue. What a great article and wonderful resource. Thank you.

