

The Way Ahead

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OUR ARMY IS SERVING a Nation at war. This war requires that all elements of our national power be applied in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign. This campaign will not be short; it will require deep and enduring commitment. Our Army is a proud member of the Joint Force expertly serving our Nation and its citizens as we continuously strive toward new goals and improve performance. Our individual and organizational approach to our duties and tasks must reflect the seriousness and sense of urgency characteristic of an Army at war. Our Soldiers and our Nation deserve nothing less. This is not business as usual. The purpose of this document is to provide the reader with a short guide to the Army's Way Ahead. It explores how we will obtain a more relevant and ready campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. My intent is to communicate the Army senior leadership's view of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces

and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. I encourage you to become familiar with the ideas presented here so that you can contribute to improving our Army. Are you wearing your dog tags?—Schoomaker¹

Introduction

The Way Ahead is an overview of *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG)*, which as the Army's institutional strategy represents the Army senior leadership's vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.² An analysis of the strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements, makes clear the Army must be prepared for operations of a type, tempo, pace, and duration different from those we have structured our forces and systems to achieve.³ Some assumptions made and processes developed for a Cold War Army or an Army with a "window of opportunity" to transform itself, while valid at the time, are no longer relevant to the current security environment.

The Army, as a key partner in the Joint Team, remains fully engaged around the globe in fulfilling its responsibilities to national security. Additionally, the

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most salient aspect of the current security environment is that we are a Nation and an Army at war—a war unlike any we have experienced in our history. As the *National Security Strategy* makes clear, “the enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”⁴ This war is being conducted across the globe and throughout the full range of military operations against rogue states and terrorists who cannot be deterred, but nevertheless must be prevented from striking against the United States, our allies, and our interests. The current conflict did not begin on September 11, 2001, and unlike the great wars of the last century, the sort of tangible events that so publicly signaled the end of World War II and the Cold War may not mark its conclusion.

We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Our Army will retain the best of its current capabilities and attributes while developing others that increase relevance and readiness to respond in the current and projected strategic and operational environments. The remainder of this document explores what we must become in order to provide more relevant and ready forces and capabilities to the Joint Team.

The Context for Change: The Current and Projected Strategic Environment

The geopolitical landscape has transformed over the last decade, creating new and growing demands for U.S. leadership across the globe. Protection afforded by geographic distance has diminished, while challenges and threats from the territories of weak and failing states and ungoverned space have grown. It is possible the current trend toward regional and global integration may render catastrophic interstate war unlikely. However, the stability and legitimacy of the conventional political order in regions vital to the United States is increasingly under pressure from a variety of sources. Population growth in developing areas places a strain on government institutions and civil infrastructures. Perceptions of an unbalanced distribution of wealth, power, cultural influence, and resources between the developed and developing worlds aggravate the potential for conflict. Conducting major combat operations against

a capable regional adversary or adversarial coalition remains the most demanding mission for the Joint Force.

The diffusion of power and military capabilities to nonstate actors and unpredictable regimes has become another potent threat to our homeland and our interests abroad. Traditional state-based armies, subnational paramilitaries, transnational terrorists, and

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even sophisticated organized crime syndicates are all becoming more capable and more dangerous. Satisfactorily offsetting the hazards of each, individually or in combination, will likely demand comprehensive, decisive, and often simultaneous actions by the United States and its allies.

The current and projected security environment suggests that America’s leaders will often confront simultaneous challenges around the globe. The events of the past decade present three realities: first, the United States is increasingly challenged by a diverse and dangerous set of potential adversaries that range from rising regional powers to terrorist movements and irresponsible regimes unbounded by accepted restraints governing international behavior; second, the world looks to the United States for leadership in a crisis—to the point of hazarding inaction without American participation; and finally, in many instances, only the United States has the requisite capabilities to affect enduring resolutions and acceptable outcomes for complex crises.

Key Geopolitical Trends

While it is clear that uncertainty remains a challenge, there are a number of trends that can assist Defense and Service leaders and planners. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified six geopolitical trends that will profoundly shape the future security environment: (1) Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance; (2) Increasing threats to regional security; (3) Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states; (4) Diffusion of

power and military capabilities to nonstate actors; (5) Increasing importance of regional security arrangements; and (6) Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of conflict.⁵

The President succinctly described the gravest danger to our Nation and our allies as lying at “the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”⁶ An analy-

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sis of the security environment reveals the nexus of dangerous new actors, methods, and capabilities imperils the U.S., its interests and its allies in strategically significant ways. First, there are now **more actors of strategic significance** [all emphasis in original]. The state system created by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 remains the basis for international order, and the threat from potentially hostile regional powers remains. Nonstate actors, however, operating autonomously or with state-sponsorship, are increasingly able to threaten regional and global security. For example, insurgents, paramilitaries, terrorists, narco-traffickers, organized criminals—frequently networked and enabled by the same tools and information systems state actors use—are an increasing concern for the U.S. Relatively flat, networked, and cellular organizations such as al-Qaeda have shown themselves willing to exploit the inability or unwillingness of failed or failing states to govern their own territory and capable of decentralized execution of complex, coordinated, and dispersed attacks against the U.S. and its interests abroad.

Second, the world now faces a significant proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies, and military capabilities employed by a variety of actors. Of particular note is the flood of conventional weapons on the market since the collapse of the previous bipolar system and the diffusion and improvement in existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or effect. The ability to generate strategic effects is no longer restricted to nation-states. Also noteworthy is the fact that all state and nonstate actors are potentially “space capable” as a result of the commercial sector’s provision of such products as high-bandwidth satellite communications, imagery, navigation signals, and weather data. We must ex-


pect both state and nonstate actors to possess and employ a combination of high- and low-tech capabilities.

Third, we can expect our adversaries to increasingly rely on idiosyncratic and dangerous methods: asymmetric approaches, anti-access and area denial strategies, unrestricted warfare, and terrorism. Given American military dominance, some adversaries will seek to bridge their conventional military gap, or lack of a conventional military capability, by adopting methods that capitalize on indirect and asymmetric approaches. For example, our adversaries may try to break our coalitions through blackmail, threats, and attacking members who maintain different policies or national objectives. They will use and exploit information systems and information gained by increased global transparency. They may attack critical infrastructure, information, and communications systems, banking and finance, energy sources, transportation, water, and emergency service facilities. Adaptive adversaries will use battlespace that reduces the effectiveness of U.S. strengths—such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision engagement—and they will seek to deny U.S. operational access to critical areas. The stark reality of contemporary battlespace conditions must be incorporated into our operational readiness training at all unit and institutional levels of training.

Implications for the Joint Force

These geopolitical and international security trends point to a period of increased strategic challenges for the Joint Force. As the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review noted, “to secure U.S. interests and objectives despite the challenges of the future security environment is the fundamental test for U.S. defense strategy and U.S. Armed Forces.”⁷ Of particular note are six implications for the Nation, the Joint Force, and the Army.

First, there is a demonstrated **requirement for full-spectrum capabilities**. Full-spectrum capabilities allow our forces to counter any capabilities our adversaries may employ against us. We must be able to rapidly transition between missions with an appropriate mix of forces and capabilities. Second, the **changing character of war increases the need for integrated operations**. In order to address more diffuse and networked adversaries, we must integrate our own elements of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and information—and while retaining the ability to act unilaterally, we must prepare to act in concert with our friends and al-



Filipino troops and US Army Special Forces soldiers of Task Force 150 search for Abu Sayyaf rebels on the island of Basilan.

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lies. Third, the **necessity for security cooperation endures**. Given the uncertainty of the security environment, the U.S. must remain fully engaged overseas. Security cooperation activities help shape the security environment to prevent conflict and facilitate U.S. operations in regions that may otherwise be difficult to access.

Fourth, **transformation of the Joint Force is a strategic imperative** to ensure U.S. forces continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage in support of strategic objectives.⁸ Fifth, countering threats to U.S. interests in a more interconnected security environment requires **mutually supporting regional actions integrated within a global strategy**. Sixth, a **joint perspective of the Current Operational Environment** must serve as the intellectual foundational component of Transformation that supports joint and service concept development and experimentation strategies. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command, in conjunction with Joint Forces Command, is leading a community effort to design and develop that framework.

Toward a More Relevant and Ready Army

To focus our efforts in increasing the relevance and readiness of our operating and institutional forces, the Army has two core competencies supported by a set of essential and enduring capabilities. **The Army's core competencies are: (1) train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and (2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commander as part of the Joint Team.**⁹ To further concentrate effort, the Army's Senior Leadership has established immediate Focus Areas with specific guidance for planning, preparation, and execution of actions aimed at rapidly effecting necessary and positive change.¹⁰ These constitute changes to existing near- and mid-term guidance and are not, nor are they intended to be, all-inclusive.¹¹ The complete expression of Army Strategic Objectives for prioritizing and programming purposes is defined in Annex B of the *ASPG*, which places the Strategic Readiness System within the context of The Army Plan.¹²



U.S. personnel conducting an exercise at the Central Command Headquarters in Qatar, December 2003.

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The Army will reorganize its combat and institutional organizations to best meet the needs and requirements of operating in the current and projected security environment. We must assume sustained operations will be the norm, and not the exception. As we continue the process of transforming our Army while at war, we will redesign our formations to provide modular, capabilities-based organizations, increasing their relevance and responsiveness to the Combatant Commanders. We will develop in our leaders, Soldiers, and Department of the Army (DA) civilians an unprecedented level of adaptability. We must have balance in our forces, with the ability to operate decisively in an uncertain environment against an unpredictable threat that will make every attempt to avoid our strengths.

Similarly, we will reexamine our doctrine, processes, education, training methodology, and systems to develop and institutionalize a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. As we seek to resolve the issues associated with transforming our Army for the current and future security environment, we must not allow solutions to be constrained by processes, policies, and systems designed for a world-system that no longer exists. Processes and policies can and will change. Systems must adapt to the needs of the Soldier, our Nation, and the Joint Force.

A Campaign-Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset

To successfully prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and ensure our Nation's security, the Army must provide the Joint Force with relevant and ready capabilities and forces to support the National Security and Defense Strategies—a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. The Army provides the Joint Force with the campaign-quality combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) capabilities necessary to conduct sustained land warfare; this is our unique contribution to the Joint Team and it will be maintained. The challenge we must address is how to transform our organizations, processes, doctrine, and culture so that we are better able to provide this contribution to the Joint Force in a more prompt and rapid manner.

Delivering the right Army forces at the right place and time is vital to the Joint Force commander's (JFC's) ability to

defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. As the Army repositions and reconfigures its forces, we will expand the JFC's ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment and against any opponent. A Joint and Expeditionary Mindset recognizes that we are an Army in contact, engaged in ongoing operations and ready to rapidly respond to the next crisis as it evolves. It is an attitude and spirit—infused across all Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) activities—that embraces a forward-leaning, modular, joint interdependent and capabilities-based Army led by aggressive, intelligent, and empowered Soldiers who recognize opportunities and confidently apply the appropriate capabilities of the Joint Force in support of the Combatant Commander.

The Army's Purpose and Role in National Security

“The Army's purpose is to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests, and fulfill national military responsibilities.”¹³ While we have performed diverse tasks since our establishment in 1775, our nonnegotiable contract with the American people has remained constant: as part of the Joint

Force, we are tasked to fight and win our Nation's wars. To achieve the objectives of the Defense Strategy, the Joint Force synergistically applies its capabilities to decisively defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. In support of the Joint Force, the Army provides versatile, robust, and agile combat forces, capable of operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners.

As the source of "trained and ready land forces capable of decisive action across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict," the Army must keep these goals and our warfighting focus constantly in mind as we perform our Title 10 functions to organize, train, and equip forces for the JFCs.¹⁴ These forces provide the Combatant Commander critical components to set the conditions for strategic and operational success by ensuring the broadest range of military options in a crisis and by providing the ability to decisively conclude conflict on our terms and timeline. Army forces add to the joint force the power to co-opt and coerce, while also providing the unique ability to control resources and populations. Army combat forces provide the means to impose our will on the enemy and to decisively defeat our Nation's adversaries.

Conducting major combat operations against a capable regional adversary or adversarial coalition

remains the most demanding mission for the Joint Force. However, resolving such conflict is only one among a myriad of complex undertakings the force may be required to perform. The Joint Force's core requirement—dominating the full spectrum of threats and challenges from peace to war—requires the capability and capacity to prevail decisively in combat and at every escalatory step an adversary may take short of war, regardless of geographic location. This dominant capability across the spectrum of conflict also provides the credibility necessary to assure friends, dissuade potential adversaries, and deter current foes.

The Defense Strategy identifies plausible missions for employing forces in the current and emerging security environment. These aims describe the Department of Defense (DOD) vision for the employment of forces and require the Services to organize, train, and equip forces to fight at multiple levels of warfare. The Joint Force must stand ready to swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries in two overlapping major combat operations and, when directed by the President, decisively defeat an adversary in one of those operations. Additionally, the military must retain the ability to conduct contingency operations in other operational scenarios. The Joint Force must have the adaptability to conduct operations ranging from homeland defense to noncombatant operations

The Army Focus Areas

- The Soldier. Develop flexible, adaptive, and competent Soldiers with a Warrior Ethos.
- The Bench. Prepare future generations of senior leaders. Identify and prepare select Army leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational, and Service organizations.
- Combat Training Centers/Battle Command Training Program. Focus training at CTC and BCTP to meet requirements of current security context, and Joint and Expeditionary teams.
- Leader Development and Education. Train and educate Army members of the Joint Team.
- Army Aviation. Conduct a holistic review of Army Aviation and its role on the Joint battlefield.
- Current to Future Force. Accelerate fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enhance effectiveness of Current Force. Army Transformation is part of constant change.
- The Network. Leverage and enable interdependent, network-centric warfare.
- Modularity. Create modular, capabilities-based unit designs.
- Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Retain our campaign qualities while developing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.
- Active Component/Reserve Component Balance. Redesign the force to optimize the Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) mix across the defense strategy.
- Force Stabilization. Ensure unit stability and continuity, and provide predictability to Soldiers and their families.
- Actionable Intelligence. Provide situational understanding to Commanders and Soldiers with the speed, accuracy and confidence to affect current and future operations.
- Installations as Flagships. Enhance Installation ability to project power and support families.
- Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountability. Clarify roles and enable agile decision-making.
- Resource Processes. Redesign resource processes to be flexible, responsive, and timely.
- Strategic Communications. Tell the Army Story so the Army's relevance and direction are clearly understood and supported.

Bundeswehr instructors show 28th Infantry Division soldiers how to operate German weapons, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, January 2004.

Ground forces offer a value far greater than forward presence alone. Through Theater Security Cooperation and assistance as well as combined exercises with foreign armed forces, Army forces contribute to lasting alliances, coalitions, and strategic partnerships.

in distant locations. Finally, the Joint Force must have the ability to source a strategic reserve to sustain operations and achieve decisive outcomes even when operations prove more demanding or prolonged than anticipated. The Army possesses essential capabilities that directly support the Joint Force in achieving the goals of the National Security and Defense Strategies by—

- Providing support to civil authorities at home and abroad. Ground forces provide a broad range of capabilities required to support civil authorities. Whether responding to natural disaster or mitigating the consequences of a WMD attack on the homeland, ground forces fulfill a vital security role. Abroad, ground combat forces establish the security conditions necessary for self-sustaining peace in important regions ravaged by conflict. This multiplies the effectiveness of interagency and international community efforts.

- Providing expeditionary capabilities to JFCs. The Army is forward deployed, strategically responsive, and capable of both forced entry and rapid reinforcement operations. Unique command, control, and logistic capabilities allow Army forces to operate on short notice in diverse, austere, and chaotic environments. These expeditionary capabilities pro-

vide an inherent enabler for joint, allied, and coalition operations and interagency coordination.

- Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to reassure friends, allies, and coalition partners. Ground combat forces set the conditions for operational success and assure global access. By their very presence, ground combat forces communicate the strongest signal of America's strategic intentions and commitments. But ground forces offer a value far greater than forward presence alone. Through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and assistance as well as combined exercises with foreign armed forces, Army forces contribute to lasting alliances, coalitions, and strategic partnerships.

- Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to dissuade and deter adversaries. The proven ability of our Soldiers contributes immeasurably to the Nation's broader ability to dissuade nation-states and nonstate actors tempted to embark upon

strategies or to invest in capabilities dangerous to U.S. interests. Though deterrence has proven increasingly difficult in the current security environment, it remains a strategic goal. The ability of ground combat forces to conduct forcible entry by air and sea in the early stages of a crisis, coupled with their unique capability to sustain combat power is a key component of strategic deterrence.

- Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to compel and decisively defeat adversaries across the full spectrum of conflict. When deterrence fails, ground combat forces are the decisive element of the Joint Force. Ground forces have the ability to render a decisive outcome by closing with and destroying enemy forces. They have the capability to occupy, seize, and control territory, and if necessary, to execute a regime change. This capability allows JFCs to preclude an adversary's options and to compel him to cease hostile action. Ground combat forces are inherently flexible and adaptable. They are ideally suited to conduct Joint Force operations in all types of terrain and weather conditions across the full range of military operations. When committed, ground combat forces have the capability to rob an adversary of initiative and remove their freedom to continue hostilities. Sea,

The aftermath of a terrorist attack in Madrid, 11 March 2004, three days before Spain's general election. (Inset) Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and President Bush speaking with reporters in the Azores, 16 March 2003.




Our adversaries may try to break our coalitions through blackmail, threats, and attacking members who maintain different policies or national objectives. They will use and exploit information systems and information gained by increased global transparency.

air, and space dominance are invaluable, but only land dominance brings hostilities to a decisive conclusion—establishing and maintaining favorable security conditions for more comprehensive and enduring solutions to complex crises.

□ Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to win the peace. To achieve enduring victory, U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared, even before hostilities end, to support post-conflict operations as part of an integrated interagency effort to begin setting the conditions for security, long-term stability, and sustainable development. This effort must leverage coalition partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in order to maximize their unique capabilities and contributions. While post-conflict actions and activities are dominated by diplomatic, economic, and information efforts designed to strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions, an integrated political-military plan is vital to enduring success. Although military means alone cannot resolve the underlying social, political, and economic

problems that lead to armed conflict, military action can be an effective precursor to achieving a lasting political settlement. The Joint Force must be prepared to transition smoothly from warfighting to maintaining a secure and stable post-hostilities environment that will enable civilian international, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations to rapidly assume their appropriate roles. Army forces, with their inherent ability to control territory, populations, and resources, may initially be the most effective means available to begin the transition to a stable and sustainable political end state. The role of the military in a post-conflict environment will vary depending on circumstances unique to each conflict. Post-conflict activities may include providing security for U.S. and coalition personnel and humanitarian relief organizations, enabling humanitarian relief and essential services to affected populations, working with international and indigenous organizations to establish law and order, and training and equipping indigenous military and security forces.



Delegates discuss issues with a moderator during a break at the Constitutional Loya Jirga in Kabul, Afghanistan, 24 December 2003.

Although military means alone cannot resolve the underlying social, political, and economic problems that lead to armed conflict, military action can be an effective precursor to achieving a lasting political settlement.

□ Providing the Nation a hedge against uncertainty. The future security environment is clouded with uncertainty. At the turn of the 20th Century no one foresaw two devastating world wars. Nor did anyone, for that matter, anticipate wars in Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan. Robust, campaign-quality ground forces offer the flexibility required to cope with wars of unexpected intensity and duration, as well as accomplish tasks in support of civil authorities. The value of expandability is even greater in an environment where potential adversaries can, with weapons of mass destruction or effects, cause catastrophic losses.

The Army: A Critical Component of the Joint Team

Joint interdependence. The Army is a critical component of the Joint Team; we must think of ourselves as indispensable and vital members of that team first and as a Service component second. We must remain aware that the Army always conducts operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—in a Joint and Expeditionary context. Prompt, sustained, and decisive land combat power acts in concert with air and naval power to ensure a syn-

ergy that gives the Joint Force capabilities and power well beyond the sum of its parts. In a few short years, the Joint Force has moved from independent, de-conflicted operations to sustained interoperability. It must now move rapidly to joint interdependence.

Joint interdependence is potentially the Joint Team's greatest asset. The Army provides the JFC with unique and complementary capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. These include supporting civil authorities at home and abroad, providing expeditionary forces, reassuring friends, allies, and coalition partners, dissuading and deterring adversaries, decisively defeating adversaries should deterrence fail, and winning the peace as part of an integrated interagency, post-conflict effort aimed at achieving enduring victory. We must examine all the capabilities resident in the Joint Force and determine the Service best positioned to provide that capability to the Combatant Commander.¹⁵ We will then be able to shed excess and redundant capabilities while concentrating our efforts and resources to enhance those capabilities the Army is best suited to contribute to the Joint Team. Both our combat and our logistics formations will become joint interdependent.

Joint operations concepts. The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) describe how the Joint Force intends to operate 15 to 20 years in the future across the entire range of operations. It provides the operational context for transformation by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. The JOpsC also provides a unifying framework for developing Service concepts and subordinate joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts, and enabling concepts. This framework will guide joint operations, as well as providing the foundation for joint and Service concept development and experimentation. The JOpsC represents a critical step in the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which envisions investment in transformational capabilities based on developing joint concepts that are validated through experimentation and informed by joint lessons learned.¹⁶ Clearly, Army concepts and capabilities must nest within the JOpsC and its unifying framework of subordinate concepts and inform the JCIDS.

The JOpsC builds on the goal of full-spectrum dominance: the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations. Full-spectrum dominance is based on the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than an adversary in any situation. In order to succeed in an uncertain, dynamic future security environment, the JOpsC emphasizes a capabilities-based and adaptable force in order to balance capabilities and manage risk within a global perspective. The JOpsC identifies the future joint force attributes that the Joint Force must embody to achieve Full-Spectrum Dominance.¹⁷

To accomplish assigned missions, the JOpsC advocates a Joint Force that is capable of conducting rapidly executable, simultaneous, and sequential operations distributed throughout a nonlinear battlespace and conducted in close coordination with interagency and multinational partners. The future Joint Force will be able to rapidly build momentum and close the gaps between decision, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. This will require the Joint Force to organize and train as capabilities-based force packages, which are quickly tailored and scaled for a flexible array of capabilities across the range of military operations.

To succeed, the Joint Force must adopt a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, reflecting greater versatility and deployability, while ensuring the necessary capabilities to conduct both sustained combat and potentially simultaneous operations to reestab-

lish stability. As is clear from the Strategic Objectives discussed in Annex B [of the ASPG], we will optimize our forces, capabilities, and organizations to best contribute to the joint capabilities and methods required of each of the joint operating concepts and joint functional concepts.¹⁸

Train and Equip Soldiers and Grow Leaders

Training and equipping Soldiers. The American Soldier remains indispensable to the Joint Team. Flexible, adaptive, and competent Soldiers infused with the Army's Warrior Culture fight wars and win the peace. Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our combat systems and formations. American Soldiers, possessed of a fierce warrior ethos and spirit, fight in close combat, dominate key assets and terrain, decisively end conflicts, control the movement of people, protect resource flows, and maintain post-conflict stability. We must never forget that it is the

Cellular organizations such as al-Qaeda have shown themselves willing to exploit the inability or unwillingness of failed or failing states to govern their own territory and capable of decentralized execution of complex, coordinated, and dispersed attacks against the U.S. and its interests abroad.

Soldier—fierce, disciplined, well trained, and well equipped—who ultimately represents and enables the capabilities we as an Army provide the Joint Force and the Nation.

We must prepare all our Soldiers for the stark realities of the battlefield. No Soldier can survive in the current battlespace without constant training in weapons and fieldcraft and a continuous immersion in the Army's Warrior Culture. There can be only one standard of training for our Soldiers, regardless of component or specialty. Our equipment and systems must be cross-leveled as necessary to support the Soldier in the warfight. We must not forget it is our Soldiers who remain the crucial link to both realizing Future Force capabilities and enhancing the effectiveness of Current Forces. We must treat Soldiers themselves as the ultimate combat system and, to this end, conduct a holistic review and analysis of individual Soldier institutional and unit training, equipping, and readiness needs. As a system, Soldiers must be medically protected and sustained for optimum performance throughout their service.

Soldiers of the 20th Special Forces Group carry the remains of an SF medic killed in Afghanistan, Bagram Airfield, January 2004.

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We must likewise prepare our Soldiers, civilians, and families for the sustained challenge of serving a Nation at war. The well-being of our Soldiers, civilians, and families is inextricably linked to our Army's readiness. Our well-being programs and family support systems must be synchronized with rotation schedules and optimized to support deployed units anchored by flagship installations. We recognize that our Soldiers and their families need an element of predictability and order in their lives. In the current strategic environment, that equates to knowing when they are most likely to deploy and making deployments as equitable as possible across the force. Achieving this will require making necessary adjustment to our mix of [AC] and [RC] capabilities and forces. It will also require the use of Force Stabilization initiatives to provide stability for Soldiers and units while enhancing unit cohesion. This will lead to a more capable force. Finally, it will mean rethinking and adapting our installation programs and

facilities to better support our Soldiers and their families. The quality and character of our installations is vital to enhancing the well-being of our Soldiers, civilians, and families, as well as enabling the Army's ability to provide trained, ready, and strategically responsive forces to the Combatant Commanders.

Growing Leaders. Leader development systems must be optimized to train and educate leaders capable of operating as part of a Joint Team at war—leaders who possess a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. The Army will take action across a broad front to make jointness an integral part of our culture. Our systems will educate and reward leaders with the mental agility to thrive at all levels in modern war. We must develop in our future leaders the right mix of unit, staff, and command experience and training and education opportunities to meet the current and future leadership requirements of the Army and the Joint Force. Our leader development systems and facilities will be redesigned for the current

and future strategic environment and acknowledge the current and projected pace of operations and deployments. The officer, noncommissioned officer, and DA civilian education systems will be adjusted to reflect our operating environment and deployment patterns, as well as reflecting Force Stabilization initiatives. We will identify, prepare, and assign select Army military and civilian leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational, and service organizations and develop and institutionalize the systems required to sustain these assignments.


To develop and train agile and adaptive leaders able to conduct simultaneous, distributed, and continuous operations, we will refocus [CTC] and [BCTP]. Leader training and development within these events must complement and help develop the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset and further a Warrior Culture. The training will nest within the Joint National Training Capability and accurately replicate the realities of the contemporary operating environment. Finally, our training institutions must better enable commanders to develop subordinate leaders. Leader and unit training must be more joint and must embed the realities of the current strategic and operational environments. We will focus the training center experience on execution and not overly emphasize the deliberate planning process.

Provide Relevant and Ready Land Power Capability to the Combatant Commander as Part of the Joint Team

By developing more modular, strategically responsive organizations and cultivating and institutionalizing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset throughout the force, the Army will greatly increase the Combatant Commander's ability to rapidly defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. Modular, capabilities-based forces will better support Combatant Commander requirements by more effectively enabling the delivery of the right Army capabilities at the right place and time. This is central to optimizing the relevance of Army forces to the Combatant Commander and expanding the Joint Team's ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment and against any opponent.

Modular, capabilities-based Army force designs will enable greater capacity for rapid and tailorable force capability packages and improve the strategic responsiveness of the Joint Force for full-spectrum operations. Modular CS and CSS units with reduced logistics footprints and sense-and-respond logistics

US Army



A 4th Infantry Division soldier secures a perimeter around a house in Tikrit, July 2003.

American Soldiers, possessed of a fierce warrior ethos and spirit, fight in close combat, dominate key assets and terrain, decisively end conflicts, control the movement of people, protect resource flows, and maintain post-conflict stability.

capabilities are essential to responsiveness, and they enhance the versatility of the Joint Force to seamlessly transition to sustained operations as a crisis or conflict develops. Informed by operational experience and Future Force designs, the Army will begin in FY 04 to implement this modularity in two of its AC divisions. These initial conversions will serve as prototypes to help accelerate the modular redesign and fielding of the Current and Future Forces.

Moving toward completely independent echelon-above-brigade headquarters will also enhance modularity. In accordance with the Unit of Employment (UE) construct, a UE_x (higher tactical headquarters) and a UE_y (operational-level headquarters) will

provide the command and control structure into which modular, capabilities-based Units of Action (UA) are organized to meet Combatant Commander requirements. Both types of UE headquarters, while able to accept joint capabilities such as a Standing

To develop and train agile and adaptive leaders able to conduct simultaneous, distributed, and continuous operations, we will refocus CTC and BCTP. Leader training and development within these events must complement and help develop the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset and further a Warrior Culture.

Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) element, will have an organic capability, depending on the contingency, to perform functions as a JTF [joint task force] or JFLCC [joint force land component command] HQ [headquarters].

The Army's ability to successfully provide the Joint Team both rapid expeditionary capabilities and the ability to conduct sustained land campaigns across the full spectrum of conflict requires both AC and RC contributions. We will restructure the Current Force, creating modular capabilities and flexible formations while obtaining the correct mix between AC and RC force structure. This rebalancing effort will enhance the Army's ability to provide the Joint Team relevant and ready expeditionary land power capability (figure 1). Our Active Component will provide rapidly responsive, agile, and expeditionary forces that typically respond in the first 15 days of an operation. The availability of adequate AC and RC follow-on forces provide the JFC the campaign quality combat, CS, and CSS capabilities necessary to achieve operational and strategic objectives and to conduct sustained land operations. Our Reserve Component will provide strategic depth to reinforce the warfight. [It] will also reinforce Support Operations and Stability Operations, and lead our efforts to protect the homeland. Either AC or RC units may provide units of the other component with additional capabilities not normally resident in those forces. To create and maintain rapidly deployable and sustainable campaign capability and depth throughout the force, we will ensure both AC and RC forces are modular, tailorable, and capable of coming to-

gether in a number of force and capabilities packages. This will allow us to reduce the time now required for mobilization and training and improve our ability to provide Combatant Commanders with needed forces and capabilities.

Redesigning the force requires a complementary and transformational method of building a cohesive team within those organizations. Force Stabilization for brigade units of action and other modular and scaleable forces will provide Combatant Commanders with more combat-ready formations. We will define and develop a plan to implement Force Stabilization concepts into the Army beginning in FY 04. Army-wide implementation will complement a rotation-based system of sustained global engagement. This system will also take the well being of Soldiers and families into account. Home-basing will stabilize Soldiers and their families at installations for extended tours. While some Soldiers may be sent on unaccompanied tours, they will then return to their Home base.

Battle command capabilities must be leveraged to enable interdependent network-centric warfare, supported by sense-and-respond logistics capabilities, within joint, interagency, and multinational full-spectrum operations. The Army must accelerate the Future Force network to enhance the Joint Battle Command capabilities of the Current Force. We must analyze the development of current network architecture and supporting systems. We will reprioritize development of the Network to focus on top-down fielding to the Current Force. Experiences and lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom will be leveraged to enhance Joint Battle Command, including Battle




Figure 1. Structuring the force.

Command on the Move, continuous operations over extended distances, Blue Force tracking capabilities, and logistics connectivity for select Current Force units. Fielding must be linked to unit rotation plans. The Army will partner with Joint Forces Command in all aspects of network development.

Current to Future Force

Transformation occurs within a context of continuous change.¹⁹ We will provide for the accelerated fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enable the enhancement of the Current Force. The goal of Army Transformation is to provide relevant and ready Current Forces and Future Forces organized, trained, and equipped for joint, interagency, and multinational full-spectrum operations. Army Transformation occurs within the larger context of continuous change brought about through the interaction of constantly evolving capabilities between Current and Future forces (figure 2).

The Current Force is the operational Army today. It is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations as part of the Joint Force. Designed to provide the requisite warfighting capabilities the JFC needs across the range of military operations, the Current Force’s ability to conduct major combat operations underscores its credibility and effectiveness for full-spectrum operations and fulfills the enduring obligation of Army forces to fight wars and win the peace. The Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become. Informed by national security and DOD guidance, it is the strategically responsive, precision maneuver force, dominant across the range of military operations envisioned in the future global security environment.

The Army must continue to develop Future Forces while simultaneously spiraling-in Future Force capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of the Current Force. In developing the Future Force, three critical challenges must be addressed: (1) the Network (C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] architecture); (2) spiral development and field experimentation; and (3) DOTMLPF. The process of identifying and accelerating selected Future Force technologies for fielding to the Current Force will be fundamental to our success in enhancing the relevance and readiness of our Army.

Establishing Priorities and Balancing Risk

Today’s strategic planning and prioritization environment is complicated by the need to balance the near-term operational risk associated with conducting the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other ongoing efforts such as the Balkans, with the Army’s responsibilities for mitigating force-management risk, institutional risk, and future challenges risk.²⁰ The Army’s policies and programs must be fully consistent with national security and defense strategic guidance, security objectives, and policies. Army policies and programs must also fulfill the current and future operational requirements of Combatant Commanders (i.e., the joint demand for Army capabilities and forces).²¹

Balancing risk is a dynamic process requiring a thorough analysis of the strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements. First and foremost, we must win the current fight and sustain the War on Terrorism. This requires giving priority to capabilities that enhance the relevance and readiness of our Army to the Joint Team today and throughout the next decade. We must ensure the Army is fully prepared, trained, and equipped for the current operational environment. We will identify and selectively accelerate key capabilities and technologies from the Future Force and spiral them into the Current Force to enhance its capability. We will provide for the Soldiers who man our Army so they can dominate across the entire spectrum of conflict. As we move toward Future Force capabilities, we must not permit gaps to appear in the near-term capabilities of the Joint Force on the expectation




Figure 2. Current to Future force.

The Joint Force must stand ready to swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries in two overlapping major combat operations, and when directed by the President, decisively defeat an adversary in one of those operations. Additionally, the military must retain the ability to conduct contingency operations in other operational scenarios.

that these gaps will be addressed at some future point. We must also seek Joint solutions and provide essential capabilities to the JFC. We must rethink our organizations, processes, culture, and institutions to develop and support a more modular, capabilities-based, strategically responsive force inculcated with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.

Conclusion

Our first priority is clear; we are engaged in a war now. This warfighting mindset is essential and must involve the entire Army. Today's terrorist threat is unprecedented—it is transnational with a vast array of resources and sponsors, including nation-states, nonstate participants, and narco-terrorist organizations. The Army must adapt its forces to meet the threat. Terrorist organizations have had years to qui-

ety build a worldwide infrastructure. Given the fanatical commitment, asymmetric capabilities, and adaptability of the threat, it is vitally important to defeat our enemies wherever they are found. Adapting our forces to meet the challenges of the GWOT will require a capabilities-based, modular, flexible, and rapidly employable Joint-Army team, capable of dominating any adversary and controlling any situation across the full range of military operations. A forward-deployed Army must be positioned around the world with the right composition and size to provide the maximum flexibility, agility, and lethality to conduct operations across the full military spectrum.

Our Nation, the Joint Force, and our Army are engaged in one of the most challenging periods in our history. Failure in the current fight is unthinkable. To defeat the enemies who threaten our freedoms, we cannot remain static, trapped in a web of our own no longer relevant policies, procedures, and processes. Transformation during a time of sustained campaigning will not be easy, but it is a practice that appears many times in the history of our great Army. We must examine, design, and develop new solutions for a new and dangerous world, as we have done so successfully in our past. This will require the deep and personal commitment of every member of the Army team—every leader, every Soldier, every civilian, and every family member. **MR**

NOTES

1. U.S. Army Strategic Communications, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2003, on-line at <www.army.mil/the wayahead/>, accessed 6 February 2004.
2. *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG)* is Section I of The Army Plan (TAP). See Army Regulation (AR) 1-1, *Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 30 January 1994). See also on-line at <www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r1_1.pdf>, accessed 1 May 2003. The ASPG meets strategic planning requirements outlined in AR 1-1 and AR 11-32, *Army Long-Range Planning System (ALRPS)* (Washington, DC: GPO, 10 January 1989), which provides baseline-planning guidance for development of mid- and near-term planning documents and establishes the benchmark used to gauge the level of success in achieving the Army's established long-range goals and mid-term objectives. See also *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002*, on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, accessed 20 May 2003. The term "defense strategy" refers to DOD strategic guidance articulated in a number of documents, particularly *Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 04-09* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001*, on-line at <www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf>, accessed 2 March 2004.
3. For a detailed discussion of these topics, see ASPG, Annex A, "National Strategic Guidance" and Annex D, "The Security Environment."
4. *The National Security Strategy*, 5-15.
5. QDR.
6. Bush.
7. QDR, 7.
8. Department of Defense (DOD), *Transformation Planning Guidance* (Washington, DC: GPO, April 2003), 4.
9. Enduring capabilities include shaping the security environment, executing prompt response, mobilizing the Army, forcible entry operations, sustained land dominance, and support for civil authorities. This represents a change that will be reflected in the next update of Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001).
10. See ASPG, Annex B. The Focus Areas are AC/RC Balance; The Soldier; The Bench; The Network; Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; Modularity; Force Stabilization; CTC/BCTP; Leader Development and Education; Army Aviation; Installations as Our Flagships; Current to Future Force; Resource Processes; Strategic Communications; Actionable Intelligence; and Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountability.
11. For the purposes of *The Army Plan*, the following definitions are used: "near-term" is within the budget year; "mid-term" is within the program objective memorandum (POM) cycle; "long-term" is beyond the POM cycle. Additional long-term guidance is located in ASPG, Annex B. The Army's near/mid- and long-term objectives are carefully constructed to appropriately balance the four dimensions of risk identified in the Defense Strategy (operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional risk) within the context of the current and projected strategic and operational environments. Operational Risk is the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency. Future Challenges Risk is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks. Institutional Risk is the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective

- operations of the Defense establishment.
12. The Strategic Readiness System assists leaders in focusing on strategic ends, ways, and means with the assistance of a Balanced Scorecard approach—a process analogous to METL development in tactical organizations. A Balanced Scorecard approach requires organizations to think about and institutionalize their core competencies and essential and enduring capabilities, and to use metrics to measure progress toward achieving strategic objectives. The SRS will enable leaders to monitor and forecast strategic performance. The Army Strategy Map, our institutional scorecard, is aligned with the Army Strategic Objectives described in Annex B of the ASPG. The SRS will, therefore, assist us in successfully executing the TAP by providing a mechanism for ensuring we stay on azimuth toward our strategic objectives. The SRS will identify for senior leaders when objectives, concepts, and resources require adjustment so that the Army can efficiently and effectively accomplish its enduring mission for the Nation. The development and articulation of the Army's Strategic Objectives is a dynamic and ongoing process. Strategic Objectives are not, and are not intended to be, static and unchanging. They will be periodically updated.
13. FM 1, 21.
14. FM 1, iv; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (Washington, DC: GPO, 25 September 1987), 16.
15. The APPG will identify Army-unique capabilities vice capabilities resident in the Joint Force.
16. Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01C, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)* (Washington, DC: GPO, 24 June 2003), on-line at <www.teao.sail.com/jfcom/ier/documents/3170_01c.pdf>, accessed 2 March 2004.
17. The seven attributes are: fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision superior, and lethal.
18. See the ASPG, Annex B.
19. See the ASPG, Annex C.
20. The Army's near/mid- and long-term objectives are carefully constructed to appropriately balance the four dimensions of risk identified in the Defense Strategy (operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional risk) within the context of the current and projected strategic and operational environments. The strategic and military risk associated with executing the missions and achieving the goals of the National Security and Defense Strategies is regularly assessed through Periodic Risk Assessment Reports as required by the Joint Risk Assessment System. Operational Risk is the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency. Future Challenges Risk is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks. Institutional Risk is the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective operations of the Defense establishment.
21. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of The Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 August 2002), on-line at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/51001.htm>, accessed 1 May 2003), 13.