

Historically Based Executioncentric Thinking

Captain Brian L. Steed, U.S. Army

*To be a successful soldier,
you must study history.*

—General George S. Patton, Jr.

USING HISTORICAL ANALYSIS in the professional education of soldiers has a long, storied past. Senior Army officers often recommend the study of history to junior officers, counseling them to read, study, and apply the lessons they learn to their profession. However, the current trend in the Army school system is to shorten courses, which necessitates the removal of various elements, such as history-related staff rides and battle analyses, from the program of instruction. Such actions are certain to prove detrimental to officers who will face situations for which personal experience and mentorship alone cannot prepare them.

If the officer corps does not return to studying and using historical analyses, it is certain to create an environment that will lead to emphasis on rote memorization and dogmatic views of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Those unfamiliar with history truly do repeat mistakes. Even a cursory study of certain trends reveals that maneuver commanders at combat training centers (CTCs) are not making “new” mistakes. The solutions to problems are available, but it is difficult for a commander preparing for a CTC rotation to sift through volumes of material for nuggets of genuine wisdom to apply to training with sufficient time and with sufficient emphasis that will result in battlefield success.

A plethora of historical material is available, so much so that many nonhistorians are overwhelmed by the magnitude. And, the Army does not spend much time helping leaders learn techniques for studying and using historical case studies. Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that most officers enter commissioned service with only one or two courses on military history. One or two hours of branch history at the various branch officer basic course

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schools might be added to this, and that is the total of military history experience junior officers receive. Yet, we expect them to immerse themselves in topics for which the organization has not prepared them. Not only do junior officers not know what it is they should study, they cannot explain why they should study it.

Officers study military history to gain experience that they might never receive personally. Officers learn from the experiences of former battlefield leaders who conducted engagements and endured conflicts. From those experiences junior officers can profit.

Officers must also understand how to analyze battles. They should be interested in what roles former leaders played in making events happen, why they happened, what the outcomes were, and what can be learned. In after-action reviews, the focus is more on why events occurred and how units tried to correct problems. In the analysis of history, the military professional spends more time in understanding the relevance and lessons learned than in factual details and trivia. The facts are important, but only as they facilitate extrapolation of the lessons.

Once we understand how to analyze military history, it becomes much easier to select which history to read. Junior officers often grab a book from the bookstore because it looks interesting rather than because it serves the greater process. They do this because they do not understand the basis of battle

analysis. We can assist professional subordinates and peers in selecting what history to study if we are critical selectors ourselves. We should select histories that provide the right environment for lessons learned at the appropriate level of leadership. Lessons learned from the study of corps, army, and army group campaigns by company or field grade officers operating at the brigade level or below are typically general and provide limited value. Study and analysis of brigade and below battles provide lessons and vicarious experience at the appropriate level during the appropriate point in one's career. By selecting and studying the right material, soldiers and units can begin to apply lessons learned to the execution of their missions.

How does this relate to executioncentric training? Rarely will the average commander have enough time to devote to studying history. Training schedules are already too full of competing demands. One way in which training and history can be linked and would permit commanders to educate subordinate leaders while enhancing their warfighting systems is to allow for focused study that directly results in improving tactical skills and the immediate application of lessons learned.

At the Armor School, the Captains Career Course uses a constructive (map-based) turn-based tactical decision tool called tactical operations (TACOPS), which is tremendously beneficial to future commanders and staff officers using the military decisionmaking process. TACOPS allows students to focus on execution rather than simply on planning. Students can rehearse, then execute, the plans they make, which allows them to see the validity of their ideas and the quality of their visualization of the battlefield. TACOPS is not a tactical validation tool; it is a decisionmaking and battlefield operating system (BOS) synchronization tool whose benefits are tremendous when compared with the terrain-board method of simulated training.

When I was a lieutenant, I served as a squadron plans and exercises officer responsible for developing a training program to help the squadron prepare for a National Training Center (NTC) rotation. During the 9 months before the rotation, the squadron conducted nine command post exercises (CPXs). Only one used the JANUS simulation. The rest were conducted on a large terrain-board replica of the NTC. The reason for abandoning technology was to maintain control over the exercise. JANUS and other operator-run simulations had too many problems. For example, once a simulation began, the exercise controller's ability to influence the exercise became limited. When training on the terrain board, exercise controllers had complete control.

TACOPS, which makes the leap between the two competing methods of training units, allows controllers or umpires to interject as much as they want or participate as little as they want. TACOPS truly allows a trainer to operate anywhere on the control

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spectrum. The computer can run it all, or the controllers can use other models. For example, if logistic training is the focus, a logistics controller can be identified. The controller conducts preparatory calculations on the rate of maintenance failures within the unit and the expected consumption rates of supplies. The controller can create logistics packages (LOGPACs) to replicate where and how many supplies would be reasonably available to the appropriate headquarters. During the game, the logistics controller can cause maintenance faults to various vehicle types and within various units based on predetermined calculations and potential terrain and enemy interaction. The player units must then react to the faults to get the appropriate combat power to the fight.

The entire list of possible scenarios TACOPS provides borders on the endless. Nearly every piece of equipment that mechanized or armor task forces could be assigned is available within the database. If a particular piece of equipment is not present, a close approximation can be made. Another benefit of this constructive training tool is its ability to design scenarios on any terrain in the world. With some effort and practice, a scanned image can be transferred into a TACOPS map. Using DeLorme's TopoUSA, maps can be pasted and cropped onto PowerPoint, turned into bitmap images, recolored using a paint program, and converted into TACOPS maps. Instructors, students, and TACOPS enthusiasts have created maps from hotspots and generic locations from all over the world. Commanders can design custom scenarios for any area to which their units deploy or to any historic battlefield for the linking of history and tactical training.

In the scenario that follows, training began with a tactical-decision game. The game was a modern scenario, but the situation was based on a historic battle. As participants worked through the battle, the overarching training objective was to train the concept of pursuit operations. Following the tactical-decision game, the players conducted a brief battle analysis of the historic battle from which the scenario was derived. This portion of the exercise was concluded with a discussion on the implications and possible lessons learned and how they could be applied to current events.

Following the discussion, participants received information and began planning and preparing for the battle. The existence of civilians within the scenario complicated the battle situation. The civilians included nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), terrorists, and benign and hostile civilians. All of these factions created a challenge and dilemma for the opponent commanders. They had competing demands, which directly involved interaction with civilians, but which required command decisions about

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how much combat power to invest in dealing with civilian issues versus military ones.

The scenario, based on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, was selected for several reasons. First, it is a battle that has significant, detailed histories written about it, and therefore, research is not difficult. Second, it is a battle fought in a complex environment that placed commanders in a significant dilemma of time, terrain, civilians, and hostiles. Third, the battle is the realization of the “expect the unexpected” mantra that military futurists continually recommend.

The situation Colonel George Armstrong Custer faced as he attacked the village on the Little Bighorn River was unlike any situation faced by any other U.S. military commander in the previous 100 years of the Nation’s history. Two specifics of this are the number of hostile warriors (from 1,200 to 3,500 depending on the historical account), which was the largest concentration of warriors west of the Mississippi in U.S. Army experience, and the fact

that for the first time (as a result of treaties with the native tribes signed circa 1874) Native Americans had ammunition in quantities that allowed for practice as well as fighting. They possessed weapons of equal or greater capabilities than those of the U.S. Cavalry. So, not only did the 7th U.S. Cavalry face a force much larger than any faced previously in the west, it also faced a better armed force. This combination of circumstances created an aberration event. Although commanders and leaders cannot typically foresee aberrations, they can, by studying aberrant battles and the dynamics that made them, gather experience to ensure that plans and preparation allow the flexibility with which to meet similar circumstances.

Tactical Decision Game

Military history is the most effective way of training during peacetime.

—Helmuth von Moltke

Situation. The situation that existed at the beginning of the tactical decision game included the following:

- Refugees from the disputed territories had settled in geographical settlement areas.

- The areas were administered under the direction of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

- Over the previous 6 months, people had been leaving the refugee settlement area and flocking to guerrilla leader Divine Justice, who was using the call for living space as a cover for narcotics trafficking. The guerrillas had formed military and political elements of their organization. The military wing was known as the People’s Liberation Front (PLF).

- The number of people leaving the settlement area had recently increased.

- United Nations (UN) R1220 authorized the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Roundup, a coalition force designed to bring Divine Justice to trial and to escort refugees back to the settlement area.

- Divine Justice had a suspected headquarters near the city of Hardin. Intelligence reports said that guerrilla leaders were gathering for an important conference.

- Hills around Hardin contained significant iron deposits, which made radio communications difficult.

- The coalition was not solidly behind the refugee-settlement policy.

- Coalition forces were attacking from multiple forward operating bases (FOBs) to capture guerrilla leaders and to return refugees to the settlement.

- An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) had been shot down south of Hardin.

Computer-driven scenarios help train staff TTP during a BCTP exercise.



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□ The southern column had not been heard from since leaving its base.

As part of JTF Roundup, Task Force (TF) Freedom is to move in from the east.

JTF Roundup. JTF Roundup requirements include the following:

□ Mission: Attack to defeat guerrilla companies not later than (NLT) 29 Apr 02 to facilitate the return of refugees to settlement camps.

□ Purpose: Establish a stable environment that will allow refugees to receive training to return to productive life within their new land.

□ Key tasks: The JTF's key tasks are to—

- Isolate guerrilla leaders.
- Capture the leaders.
- Deny guerrilla companies freedom of maneuver. (Speed is essential.)
- Prevent companies or leaders from establishing a redoubt in the hills southwest of Hardin.

□ End state: Bring guerrilla leaders to trial for crimes against humanity, and resettle refugees in camps.

TF Freedom. TF Freedom will do the following:

- Task: Isolate guerrilla leaders.

□ Purpose: Deny guerrillas escape from Objective (OBJ) Capture.

□ Guidance: Prevent Divine Justice's escape.

□ Task organization. (Omitted for brevity.)

People's Liberation Front. To capture the PLF, perform the following actions:

□ As you approach the area, you find abandoned camps but no PLF forces (27-28 Apr 02).

□ Your trail elements have contact with PLF scouts, who displace rapidly to the west (280030 Apr02).

□ Your coalition reconnaissance element reports large dust trails to the west of OBJ Capture, and vehicles are seen moving south and west (280500 Apr02).

□ You cannot gain radio contact with the JTF commander.

□ The time is 0600 hours on 28 Apr 02.

□ What do you do?

Battle analysis. After the tactical decision game (TDG), a battle analysis of the Battle of the Little Bighorn was presented to provide the historical foundation for discussion and derivation of lessons learned. The emphasis on this particular battle was

to paint the complexity of decisionmaking in combination with cultural, social, operational, and personal contexts. Because many tend to view the Battle of the Little Bighorn in either black or white, the intent was to introduce gray to emphasize its complexity.

Following the battle analysis, key players received instructions, and the tactical decisionmaking process evolved to a different level. The instructions provided a high level of detail to demonstrate the ability of the system to replicate actual unit capabilities. Each element commander received information on friendly and enemy situations. The friendly situation was similar to that provided in the TDG, but with some additional information, including the doctrinal templates of their opponents. The commanders also received a detailed layout of all assets within their command. Finally, the observer/controllers (OCs) received complete copies of all materials plus additional administrative instructions to help facilitate BOS not replicated well within the TDG.

TACOPS Fight Based on the Battle of the Little Bighorn

Friendly situation (Blue-Force (BLUFOR) instructions also include those to green forces). Refugees from disputed territories have been settled into geographical settlement areas being administered under the direction of the UNHCR. Over the previous 6 months, people left the refugee settlement area and flocked to guerrilla leader Divine Justice. Justice is using the need and call for living space as a cover for narcotics trafficking. The number of people leaving the settlement area increased recently. UN Resolution 1220 authorized JTF Roundup, a coalition force designed to bring Divine Justice to trial and to escort refugees back to the settlement area.

The disputed area is marked by four communities: Hardin, Reno, South Town, and Easton. The area boasts a population of over 1,500 people. A UNHCR representative has traveled to the disputed territory to meet with the elements of the refugee population. They and several other NGOs are currently trying to help alleviate refugees' deprivation and suffering.

NGO assistance in the area includes a UNHCR representative, who is reported to be in Reno; the International Red Cross, which is treating a hepatitis outbreak in South Town; the International Red Crescent, which is providing vaccinations for smallpox in Reno; UNICEF, which is monitoring educational development in Hardin; Doctors Without Borders, who are in Easton where they are providing medical assistance to the clinic; and an election monitoring board, which is traveling throughout the area

to ensure that ongoing district elections are fair and unbiased. Media representatives from CNN, ITN, and the BBC are present throughout the area. They are covering Divine Justice and the monitoring of elections. Election monitors and the media are moving by either car or helicopter. The NGOs have acknowledged the UN resolution and have announced that they will conclude their business and be out of the area today.

The local populace is supportive of Divine Justice and his people. The recent influx of refugees has, however, created friction between the two civilian populations. Despite the friction, some elements of the indigenous population hate the U.S.-led coalition and the JTF that represents it.

JTF Roundup is attacking from multiple FOBs from different directions. Its mission and intent include the following:

- Mission: Attack to defeat guerrilla companies NLT 29 Apr 02 to facilitate the return of refugees to settlement camps.

- Purpose: Establish a stable environment that will allow refugees to receive training and to return to productive life within their new land.

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 - Isolate guerrilla leaders.
 - Capture the leaders.
 - Deny guerrilla companies freedom of maneuver. (Speed is essential.)
 - Prevent companies or leaders from establishing a redoubt in the hills southwest of Hardin.

- End state: Bring guerrilla leaders to trial for crimes against humanity, and resettle refugees in camps.

TF Freedom is attacking from the east. The southern column has not been heard from since leaving it. TF Freedom is the direct pressure force; two other task forces will provide the envelopment. The JTF commander has given the following guidance:

- Task: Isolate guerrilla leaders.
- Purpose: Deny guerrillas escape from OBI Capture.

- Guidance: Prevent Divine Justice's escape.
- Task organization. (Omitted for brevity.)

TF Freedom has just arrived in Easton, from where it must begin the attack to accomplish the mission. As it establishes its forces, its line of departure (LD) runs from 21030 to 210280 to 240260 to 240000.

Enemy situation. The enemy force is a complex of military forces, civilian militia, and terrorist cells, not all of who are from the same faction as that of Divine Justice. The terrorists, in particular, are typically from the local populace. Forces in a more traditional military role are equipped with sto-

len equipment. The enemy force is currently divided as indicated on the rough situation template and, therefore, will not be able to mass against you. Divine Justice's organization, roughly based on a light infantry organization with wheeled transportation, uses civilian vehicles for transportation, has some UAV capability, and despite its loose-sounding organization, has a robust combat capability.

It is suspected that Divine Justice's headquarters is near Hardin. Intelligence reports say that guerrilla leaders are gathering for an important conference.

The hills around Hardin contain significant iron deposits, which cause difficult radio communications. A UAV has been shot down south of Hardin. One tank company, whose commander was reportedly sympathetic to Divine Justice, has not been heard from in more than a month. Terrorists cells operate in 5- to 20-man teams and typically use car and truck bombs as their primary delivery means. The terrorists might have recently acquired nuclear material from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation to the west and could have created a low-yield, dirty, nuclear device.

Divine Justice has the ability to fight, but he wants to establish permanence with his people. He will probably run rather than fight because his forces are scattered throughout a wide area. He is seeking to establish an operating base in the mountain ranges to the southwest.

Task organization. (Omitted for brevity.)

People's Liberation Faction

Friendly situation. Divine Justice is gathering and consolidating forces for combat power. As his senior military commander in command of all military forces in the theater, you help gather the forces, but you also must protect approximately one-thousand civilians. These are your people. They are family and extended family to you and to your soldiers. You must evacuate them from the area along the river to the southwest. In that direction are rugged mountains that you will be able to defend against any force.

Divine Justice concurs with a fighting withdrawal and directs you to move your people out of the area. They must exit along the river valley shown in the southwest area of the map. You must also delay coalition forces long enough to escape with the civilians and to get the majority of your military force out as well. You might receive assistance from cells of loyalists from local communities. There are six car and truck bombs that await your direction for targeting. The longer your people stay in the area, the less friendly many of the civilians become.

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and to escort refugees back to the settlement area. This has been the catalyst for the latest U.S.-led incursions into your territory.

NGO assistance in the area includes a UNHCR representative, who is reported to be in Reno; the International Red Cross, which is treating a hepatitis outbreak in South Town; the International Red Crescent, which is providing vaccinations for smallpox in Reno; UNICEF, which is monitoring educational development in Hardin; Doctors Without Borders, who are in Easton where they are providing medical assistance to the clinic; and an election monitoring board, which is traveling around the area to ensure that ongoing district elections are fair and unbiased. Media representatives from CNN, ITN, and the BBC are present throughout the area. They are covering Divine Justice and the monitoring of elections. Election monitors and the media are moving around either by car or helicopter. The NGOs have acknowledged the UN resolution and have announced that they will conclude their business and be out of the area today.

Divine Justice gave you the following guidance before your meeting with him concluded:

- Task: Delay U.S. forces, and evacuate all of our people.

- Purpose: Protect the force for future defenses in the south and west.

- Guidance: Protect the force for use later in the campaign. Do not lose it all in a major engagement. However, if a major engagement is unavoidable, destroy as many Americans as possible so they will remember our people forever.

Enemy situation. The S2 believes that the BLUFOR will remain roadbound as they attack from east to west. They are focused on major objectives that will provide the greatest media attention; are susceptible to roadblocks and hit-and-run attacks; are a mechanized battalion task force, augmented with coalition forces; are equipped with M1A2s, M2s, M60A3s, LAV IIIs, and AGS; and have a variety of technological gadgets and possess a robust reconnaissance and infantry detachment.

Task organization. (Omitted for brevity.)

Local Populace Instructions

Friendly situation. During the past 6 months, Divine Justice has encouraged his people to come and live in your area. You greeted them with open arms. Many of your young men find Divine Justice to be a charismatic leader and have taken up his cause, showing their anger and frustration against American oppression. They have turned to suicide bombing as their only way to demonstrate their protest. The remainder of the populace is becoming

more and more annoyed at the endless influx of refugees and the strain they are placing on the social system. An election is to be held to determine who will be the leaders of your people and the course they will travel. The populace is divided: 30 percent favor Divine Justice; 40 percent are opposed to the refugees; and 30 percent are undecided. You have recently sought help from UN agencies. UN Resolution 1220 authorized JTF Roundup, a coalition force designed to bring Divine Justice to trial and to escort refugees back to the settlement area.

You have received some help from the many NGOs operating throughout the area, including the following: a UNHCR representative, who is reported to be in Reno; the International Red Cross, which

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is treating a hepatitis outbreak in South Town; the International Red Crescent, which is providing vaccinations for smallpox in Reno; UNICEF, which is monitoring educational development in Hardin; Doctors Without Borders, who are in Easton where they are providing medical assistance to the clinic; and an election monitoring board, which is traveling around the area to ensure that ongoing district elections are fair and unbiased. Media representatives from CNN, ITN, and the BBC are present throughout the area. They are covering Divine Justice and the monitoring of elections. Election monitors and the media are moving around either by car or helicopter. The NGOs have acknowledged the UN resolution and have announced that they will conclude their business and be out of the area today. Your people are trying to move to the election polls at the four towns and to where medical assistance is provided, in either Hardin or Easton.

Terrorist cells operate in 5- to 20-man teams and typically use car and truck bombs as their primary delivery means. They are coded as civilians with mixed weapons. They might have recently acquired nuclear material from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation to the west and could have created a low-yield, dirty, nuclear device. The terrorists are suicidal, but they do not wish to inflict harm on their own people. They will likely attack U.S. and coalition targets away from other civilian locations.

Mission. The mission includes traveling to Hardin or Easton. Terrorist cells will conduct direct action against mechanized forces to delay their approach to the river.

Task organization. (Omitted for brevity.)

Nongovernmental Organization Instructions

Friendly situation. Your personnel are in the region to prevent a humanitarian disaster. You represent a variety of groups that will require significant role-playing throughout the exercise.

NGO assistance in the area includes a UNHCR representative, who is reported to be in Reno; the International Red Cross, which is treating a hepatitis outbreak in South Town; the International Red Crescent, which is providing vaccinations for smallpox in Reno; UNICEF, which is monitoring educational development in Hardin; Doctors Without Borders, who are in Hardin where they are providing medical assistance to the clinic; and an election monitoring board, which is traveling around the area to ensure that ongoing district elections are fair and unbiased. Media representatives from CNN, ITN, and the BBC, are present throughout the area. They are covering Divine Justice and the monitoring of elections. Election monitors and the media are moving around either by car or helicopter. The NGOs have acknowledged the UN resolution and have announced that they will conclude their business and be out of the area today.

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Mission. General instructions for the mission include the following:

- At 0900, all UN work will move toward Easton.
- Work will begin on the classroom computer.
- The media will report and broadcast all atrocities on the big screen.
- Coordination and communication activities will begin as expected within a UN-mandated operation to BLUFOR commanders, who will role-play to ensure that all commanders have an equal headache with these actions.

Specific instructions include the following:

- UNHCR activities will begin in Reno then travel to South Town, where evacuation of all civilians to Hardin for UNICEF treatment and voting will begin. There is no poll in South Town.

- The International Red Cross in South Town will continue to treat civilians throughout the exercise.
- The International Red Crescent in Reno will continue to treat civilians throughout the exercise.
- UNICEF representatives in Hardin have no specific instructions.
- Doctors Without Borders in Easton will continue to treat civilians throughout the exercise.
- Election monitors in Hardin will move between Hardin, Reno, and Easton to monitor election activities.
- CNN in Easton will cover coalition, election, relief efforts, and terrorist actions.
- ITN in Hardin will cover coalition, election, relief efforts, and terrorist actions.
- The BBC in Reno will cover coalition, election, relief efforts, and terrorist actions.

Task organization. (Omitted for brevity.)

Administrative Instructions

AN/TPQ36 Firefinder Radar. The game does not automatically play the effects of the Q-36 radar. The head OC must adjudicate the Q-36's effectiveness based on designated critical friendly zones and other student planning. Once coverage is determined, the OC must adjudicate the effectiveness of counterbattery fire.

BLUFOR positions. Each team is positioned and should not be administratively moved. However, task organization changes are allowed. If the BLUFOR opts to adjust task organization, it cannot move assets beyond the existing locations until after "Game On."

Communications. The head OC must evaluate the terrain and communications plan. If the tactical operations center (TOC) cannot talk with companies because of terrain, then the OC can deny communications until retransmission is established.

Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR). The head OC determines the system's game capabilities based on equipment capability (6,000 meters dismounted; 10,000 meters mounted) and terrain or battlefield constraints and restrictions (dead space, obscurants, suppressive fires, and so on). The head OC then adjudicates the effective observation of the GSR and informs the S2 or the GSR controlling headquarters of the location and type of units the GSR identifies.

Logistics. Resupply points govern logistics. Once resupply points are exhausted there will be no more resupply.

Forward arming and refueling points (FARP). The BLUFOR FARP must consist of a minimum of one heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) fueler and one HEMTT cargo. Aircraft refuel or rearm time is 5 minutes of game time.

Maintenance. Any vehicle that is a firepower or mobility kill may be repaired if the following conditions are met:

□ If an appropriate maintenance vehicle (M88, tool truck, M113 maintenance armored personnel carrier) moves to the broken vehicle.

□ If the maintenance vehicle remains stationary next to the broken vehicle for 5 game minutes.

□ If the computer OC repairs the vehicle in CPX Umpire Mode.

Resupply. All ground resupply is provided by LOGPACs. Once a LOGPAC moves next to a vehicle, the resupply button may be used. Commanders must designate whether the LOGPAC is vehicle-mounted or pre-stock. If the LOGPAC is destroyed, it is destroyed. Once points are exhausted, there is no more resupply unless higher headquarters can provide some.

Vehicle delivered. An appropriate resupply vehicle must carry the LOGPAC to the vehicle in need of resupply.

Pre-stock. The LOGPAC may be placed within an entrenchment, but only if one is allocated. The LOGPAC cannot be paired with any other vehicle.

Mobility, countermobility, survivability. Breaching is conducted in accordance with game conditions and the orders menu.

Family of scatterable mines (FASCAM). *Artillery-delivered.* To emplace an artillery-delivered minefield, the following conditions must be met:

□ The squadron TOC will give a 15-real-minute warning to the artillery battalion S3 during the game.

□ If FASCAM is to be fired at the beginning of the game, the warning is unnecessary.

□ The designated artillery battery must fire at the designated target for 30 game minutes using the adjust-fire designation. (If an entire battalion fires, the time is only 10 game minutes.)

□ After 30 minutes, the computer OC uses the CPX umpire mode to place the minefield, as designated by the fire support officer.

VOLCANO-delivered. To emplace a VOLCANO-delivered minefield, the following conditions must be met:

□ The M548 must move to the VOLCANO start point. Once there, it drives the VOLCANO trace.

□ Once this action has been completed, the computer OC uses the CPX umpire mode to place the minefield, as designated by the S3 or engineer.

Opposing force (OPFOR) obstacles. The OPFOR is allocated 24 obstacles at the beginning of the game. They can be minefields, wire, abatis, and so on. They must be designated and placed within the first 30 minutes of preparation time on the master computer and then saved. This minimizes computer difficulties.

OPFOR positions. The OPFOR may position itself anywhere on the map. Companies must be separated between three areas because they begin the game dispersed, not in a consolidated defense. Area 1 is north of Hardin. Area 2 is south of South

Town. Area 3 is near Easton. The forces are established as such, with the remainder of combat power near Reno. Virtually no pre-positioning (magic movement) is allowed, with the exception of OPFOR reconnaissance.

OPFOR reconnaissance. OPFOR assets are already in position, so there is no line of departure (LD) or limit of advance.

Time. Once the game begins, there are 3 minutes of play followed by 2 minutes of orders. There is no specification about how or when reports are offered to higher headquarters.

Conclusion

I prefer to learn from the experience of others.

—Otto von Bismark

The series of instructions above are detailed. However, details provide the OC the ability to properly facilitate the training objectives that the commander designates. In fact, even more details might be needed if greater emphasis is placed on maintenance or logistics. The instructions could even be expanded into complete five-paragraph operations orders if training objectives require them. Two OCs are required at a minimum, more depending on the desired level of feedback. When this information is combined with details found on the game icons, sufficient information is available to craft whatever level orders and plans the commander chooses to use.

This game's nature is such that it provides myriad training opportunities. Nearly every Army installation and unit can meet its low logistic requirements. Even when deployed, with only limited technical challenges, several computers could be linked. The challenge requires the designated subject matter expert to study. The facilitator of the original TDG and battle analysis must be expert in the battle and in the associated modern scenario.

The game also requires someone who is familiar with the workings of TACOPs to ensure the smooth flow of the actual battle. A smoothly functioning TACOP links military history with execution-centered training in a way that brings history alive and brings real meaning to the phrase "lessons learned." TACOP goes beyond the teaching of history, it helps military professionals appreciate the challenges faced by great and poor commanders and to learn from them on the terrain on which they fought.

If we believe what we tell junior officers—that the study of military history is critical to our profession—then we must demonstrate this in action and training rather than simply in words. The TDG is a

TACOPS, which makes the leap between the two competing methods of training units, allows controllers or umpires to interject as much as they want or participate as little as they want. TACOPS truly allows a trainer to operate anywhere on the control spectrum.

The computer can run it all, or the controllers can use other models.

method that has proven effective in linking historical analysis with a modern fight that tests the limits of full-spectrum operations against a contemporary operational environment. Any task organization could be designed to accommodate any training objective at virtually any level from brigade and below. The Armor School has graduated several courses of captains proficient in the use of this constructive decision tool, and they can serve as the corps of observers, facilitators, and controllers.

The lessons in this scenario are numerous and can vary, based on the actual battles conducted. When given a time-constrained planning window, a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield seems unnecessary. Commanders with limited bridges in zone with only a handful of tactical bridging assets seem not to anticipate the challenges of crossing rivers. The concept of how an unconventional opponent might use his resources and capabilities is challenging. Until a commander understands that point, his course of action (COA) will invariably not be what his forces will execute on the ground.

The challenge of dealing with civilians, benign and otherwise, is demanding. Making conscious decisions about the commitment of combat power to control and move civilians, and assessing the need for force protection at different places on the battlefield at different times is problematic. This battle brought out each of these points and many more. Some of these points could be directly linked to the historical record, but most will be unique to each commander's COA and the actual flow of the battlefield.

We must bring historical analysis back into unit-level training. We are in an age of dramatic change. Our personal experiences will not be sufficient to train units and subordinate leaders for the challenges they might face during their periods of responsibility or over the course of their careers. As professionals, we must turn to the historical record to gain the experience that will apply in future conflicts. **MR**

Captain Brian L. Steed, U.S. Army, is troop commander of 4 Troop, 2-16th Cavalry, Fort Knox. He received a B.A. from Brigham Young University and an M.A. from Vermont College of Norwich University.